Do Punishments Affect Willingness to Report?

How to cite

Lam, Quy; Sheth, Ketki. 2024. "Do Punishments Affect Willingness to Report?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013393. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13393-1.1

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Quy Lam* , Ketki Sheth

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013393
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13393-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-04-01 – 2024-05-27
Countries
United States of America ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13393

Abstract

Punishment is commonly used by lawmakers to deter criminal behavior. Punishments do not just punish offenders, but they also deter other people from committing the same crimes. In monitoring and investigating crimes, the inside knowledge or tips provided by private citizens who have knowledge of the crime offer valuable information to the authority. However, it is unclear about the relationship between the severity of punishment and likelihood of reporting crimes. In this study, we examine whether the severity of sanctions will affect people’s decision to report crimes.

Experimental design

We employ an experimental game in which subjects are assigned to be "employees" that are part of a "firm" or members of the "public".
For those assigned to be members of the firm: In the first round of the game, the firm members are given a task in which their payouts are a function of their own and their co-workers' performance. In the main stage of the game, one subject is randomly assigned to become the firm's "manager". As before, payouts in this stage are based on the performance of all members, but the "manager" has an opportunity to "break the law". Breaking the law benefits members of the firm, but harms members of the public. We randomly assign the severity of the penalty for breaking the law across firms, our key treatment variable. We conclude the experiment with a series of survey questions.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done using Lioness platform
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
No clusters
Observations
700 individuals (560 employees, 140 managers). This sample size is based on our budget for the experiment. However, we will continue to recruit participants until we deplete our budget.
Arms
233 individuals per treatment arm (i.e., 3 treatment arms with equal probability for assignment)
Primary outcomes
Reporting of subjects (i.e., managers) who break the law (Decision by Employees) Deciding to break the law given information on reporting rates by employees (Decision by Manager)
Secondary outcomes
Deciding to break the law when given no information on reporting rates by employees (Decision by Manager) Beliefs on how many managers will break the law Beliefs on how many employees will report law-breaking managers

Cited by

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Keywords