Complexity and the demand and supply of narratives

How to cite

Schmacker, Renke; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Rotesi, Tiziano. 2024. "Complexity and the demand and supply of narratives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013350. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13350-1.0

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Renke Schmacker* , Rustamdjan Hakimov , Tiziano Rotesi

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013350
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13350-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-04-20 – 2024-06-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C91, D83, D01
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13350

Abstract

This project studies the effect of complexity on the selection of models in a market environment. We simulate a market involving three types of agents – buyers, non-expert sellers, and expert sellers who have access to better data statistics – interacting over multiple rounds. In this "market for models", all agents have access to the same data but must choose among different models that explain these data. Buyers are incentivized to select the most accurate model, while sellers also have an incentive to match the preferences of the buyer. Our study will first assess how increased complexity affects the dynamics of model selection from both the sellers' and the buyers' perspectives. Subsequently, we will explore market design interventions that could alter these dynamics. This includes education of buyers by informing them about the accuracy of the chosen statement. Additionally, we will introduce a reputation system allowing buyers to evaluate sellers based on their past offers.

Intervention

2x3 treatment design

Univariate&Bivariate vs. Univariate&Interacted: In the first treatment arm, we vary the complexity of the data-generating process (with univariate being the simplest and interacted being the most complex model).

Baseline vs. Feedback vs. Reputation: In the second treatment arm, we introduce two market design interventions and compare it to the baseline treatment. In the feedback treatment, buyers receive feedback on the accuracy of their selected model. In the reputation treatment, buyers see a history of the models offered by each seller.

Experimental design

See below

Design details

Randomization method
Randomisation by a computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
Target sample: 1440 to 1680 subjects in total (The final sample depends on the budget and how many subjects can be matched into groups of three. Those who cannot be matched have to be paid the participation fee and it is a priori not clear how many these will be.)
Observations
Target sample size: 1440 to 1680 subjects in total (The final sample depends on the budget and how many subjects can be matched into groups of three. Those who cannot be matched have to be paid the participation fee and it is a priori not clear how many these will be.)
Arms
Target sample size: Baseline: 300-360 univ/biv + 300-360 univ/inter (100-120 groups) Feedback: 210-240 univ/biv + 210-240 univ/inter (70-80 groups) Reputation:210-240 univ/biv + 210-240 univ/inter (70-80 groups)
Primary outcomes
(i) Share of correct models offered (1) in general and (2) by experts (ii) Share of overly simplistic models (in general and by experts) (iii) Share of overly complex models (in general and by experts) (iv) Share of buyers who select the correct model
Secondary outcomes
(i) Payouts (ii) Share of experts selected

Cited by

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Keywords