Communication Architecture Affects Gender Differences in Negotiation

How to cite

Greenberg, Adam Eric; Petrie, Ragan. 2024. "Communication Architecture Affects Gender Differences in Negotiation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013334. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13334-1.0

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Adam Eric Greenberg* , Ragan Petrie

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013334
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13334-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-04-10 – 2025-04-10
Countries
Private
JEL codes
J16, C78, C91
Secondary IDs
negotiation, gender earnings gap, communication architecture, unstructured bargaining
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13334

Abstract

We will compare how unaltered audio versus altered audio (i.e., that in which the pitch is shifted to obscure gender) will affect gender differences in negotiation.

Experimental design

University lab subjects will be recruited to participate in experiments in the Texas A&M Economic Research Laboratory. In each session, subjects will be randomly assigned to the role of buyer or seller, and will be assigned to negotiate over a trading price with randomly matched participants in the opposite role. There will be two treatments assigned as the session level: Voice and Modified Voice. Half of the sessions will require negotiation via Zoom audio without chat; the other half will use the same interface but with pitch-modified audio to obscure the voice (and thus, gender) of participants.

Participants are randomly assigned to the role of buyer or seller and keep the same role for all four rounds of negotiation. Each negotiation is with a new, randomly-matched partner of the opposite role. In each negotiation round, the buyer is assigned an integer-valued private value, drawn randomly from the range [45, 46, 47, . . . , 55], and the seller is assigned an integer-valued private cost, drawn randomly from the range [10, 11, 12, . . . , 20]. In each round, the buyer and seller negotiate over the trading price. The buyer’s profit is equal to the private assigned value minus the agreed-upon trading price; the seller’s profit is equal to the agreed-upon trading price minus the private cost. Participants are given five minutes to negotiate with their partners. If five minutes pass without agreement, then both earn a profit of zero. Costs of delay are introduced as follows: buyers’ private values are reduced by 1 and sellers’ private costs are increased by 1 every 20 seconds beginning at the 3-minute mark until the end of the negotiation. All participants will also respond to a post-experiment survey.

We predict that the gender gap in earnings will be smaller when voice is modified. We also predict that sellers will, on average, earn less than buyers.

Design details

Randomization method
Done by a computer
Randomization unit
Audio versus Modified Audio will be randomized at the session level. Role of buyer and seller will be randomized at the individual level (within session).
Clusters
We will cluster at the subject level (128 subjects). Sessions will contain ~16 subjects.
Observations
512 negotiations (128 subjects * 4 negotiations per subject)
Arms
128 subjects across the two treatments (i.e., 64 subjects per treatment)
Primary outcomes
Earnings in negotiations conducted in an experimental laboratory setting

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Keywords