Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi
How to cite
Goldberg, Jessica; Yang, Dean; Giné, Xavier. 2016. "Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001330. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1330-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We implemented a randomized field experiment in Malawi examining borrower responses to being fingerprinted when applying for loans. This intervention improved the lender’s ability to implement dynamic repayment incentives, allowing it to withhold future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. As predicted by a simple model, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. We provide unique evidence that this improvement in repayment rates is accompanied by behaviors consistent with less adverse selection and lower moral hazard.
Intervention
The trial tests whether biometric identification improves moral hazard and adverse selection in rural credit markets in Malawi. Farmer loan groups in Malawi were offered credit to grow paprika. After the baseline survey was administered to individual farmers a training session was held for on the importance of credit history in ensuring future access to credit. Then, in treatment groups only, fingerprints were collected as part of the loan application and an explanation was given that this would be used to determine their identity on any future loan applications. Following this, loan applications were processed in the usual way without the status of fingerprinting being taken into account as a factor for loan approval.
Experimental design
The loans were provided by the Malawi Rural Finance Corporation (MRFC) to farmers for purchasing "starter kits" from Cheetah Paprika Limited (CP). CP is a privately owned agri‐business company that offers extension services and inputs at subsidized rates in exchange for farmers' commitment to sell the paprika crop to CP at harvest time.
Farmers were asked to form groups of 15-20 members in order to apply for the loan, even though loans were given to individuals. The study sample consisted of 214 clubs with 3,206 farmers with half randomly allocated to treatment and the rest forming the control group. In treatment clubs only, fingerprints were collected as part of the loan application. A total of 1,147 applicants took out the loan.
An endline survey was administered after the harvested crops were sold to CP, but with 520 farmers. Due to budget constraints it was not possible to visit every participant rather, study participants were invited to come to a central location to be administered the follow-up interview. Not all farmers came for the follow-up survey but there was no evidence of selective attrition related to treatment status.
Design details
Materials
Papers from this trial
- Gine, Xavier, Jessica Goldberg, and Dean Yang. 2012. "Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi." American Economic Review: 102(6): 2923-2954. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/280_383%20fingerprinting%20malawi%20AER2012.pdf
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