Measuring Vote-Selling: Field Evidence from the Philippines

How to cite

Ravanilla, Nico; Yang, Dean; Leider, Stephen; Hicken, Allen. 2016. "Measuring Vote-Selling: Field Evidence from the Philippines." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001328. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1328-1.0

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Nico Ravanilla* , Dean Yang , Stephen Leider , Allen Hicken

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001328
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1328-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2013-04-01 – 2013-06-30
Countries
Philippines (Southeast Asia)
JEL codes
D72, O17
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1328

Abstract

Using data from an anti-vote-buying field experiment we conducted in the Philippines, we report and validate a proxy measure for vote-selling. We demonstrate that our proxy measure, vote-switching, changes as expected with voter preferences and monetary offers from candidates. Voters are less likely to vote for someone different than their initial preference the larger the favorability rating difference between the preferred and alternative candidates. Similarly, vote-switching increases the more money the alternative candidate offers compared to the preferred candidates. We also describe the effects of the promise-based interventions on vote-switching, reported in full in a companion paper.

Intervention

Researchers in the Philippines tested whether a verbal ‘promise’ against vote-buying has any impact on voting behavior. During the May 2013 municipal elections in Sorsogon City, respondents were shown a three-minute video clip that encouraged viewers to turn out to vote, vote for honest and competent candidates, and avoid vote-selling. All respondents were then asked to rank political candidates, indicating for whom they wanted to vote in the upcoming elections, and randomly assigned to one of three groups:
(a) Promise 1 treatment group: asked to promise not to accept money from any candidates
(b) Promise 2 treatment: asked to promise to “vote your conscience,” even if they took money from a candidate.
(c) Comparison: only watched the video.
Following the elections, respondents were surveyed again.

Experimental design

The experiment considers outcomes in three types of municipal elections: mayor, vice-mayor and city council in Sorsogon City. During the baseline survey, enumerators visited randomly selected households and showed them the video clip after which respondents were assigned to one of three treatment arms: promise 1, promise 2 and control.

In the month following the election, participants were surveyed a second time. Participants reported whether they had voted, and who they had voted for in each race. Voters could vote for one candidate for mayor, one candidate for vice-mayor, and up to four candidates for city council.

Design details

Randomization method
Done in office by computer.
Randomization unit
Individual voter
Clusters
Study not clustered
Observations
883 voters
Arms
Control: 300 Promise Treatment 1 (accept no money): 300 Promise Treatment 2 (vote your conscience):300
Primary outcomes
Vote switching

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Hicken, Allen, Stephen Leider, Nico Ravanilla, and Dean Yang. 2015. “Measuring Vote-Selling: Field Evidence from the Philippines." American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, May 2015. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/735%20Vote-Selling%20in%20Philippines%20May2015.pdf

Cited by

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Keywords