Automatic Payments and Tax Evasion: an experimental study

How to cite

Paoli, Damiano; Valori, Vincenzo; Pazienza, Maria Grazia; Colucci, Domenico. 2024. "Automatic Payments and Tax Evasion: an experimental study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013243. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13243-2.2

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Damiano Paoli* , Vincenzo Valori , Maria Grazia Pazienza , Domenico Colucci

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013243
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13243-2.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2024-03-26 – 2024-09-01
Countries
Italy (Toscana)
JEL codes
C91, H26, H31
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13243

Abstract

This study aims to assess the scope for a policy to increase tax compliance in the area of car tax, focusing on the case of the Tuscany regional administration in Italy. In particular the impact of automatic payment systems on tax evasion is the specific research goal of this paper. To this end we design a laboratory experiment where subjects play a Tax Evasion Game. Participants receive a fixed endowment and engage in a real effort task under time pressure where they have the opportunity to earn cash and are also simultaneously required to pay a tax, spending a portion of the available time to pay it successfully. While evading the tax offers a higher expected payoff, it also carries the risk of a significant fine if detected. In the intervention treatment, we introduce an automatic payment option, allowing participants to commit to the tax payment before beginning the effort task. We find that reducing the non-monetary burden significantly improves tax compliance. We also elicit risk aversion and find that it does not explain the observed treatment effect.

Intervention

We designed a Tax Evasion Game where subjects have to complete a real effort task under time pressure to obtain a payoff and simultaneously have to decide whether to pay or not a tax by inserting a code. The intervention introduced in one of the two treatments is an automatic payment option that allows participants to pay the tax automatically without inserting the code during the real effort task.

Experimental design

Participants receive an endowment m. They will have to carry out an activity that will require constant commitment (effort task) and that can generate a maximum income of 2m. In addition, at the same time as the effort task, they will also be required to pay a tax equal to the entire endowment m. If they don't pay it, they will be audited with a given probability and will pay a fine equal to m which is added to the entire tax, resulting in an outflow equal to 2m. The expected payoff of not paying the tax is positive.
The effort task is an activity that lasts 45 seconds and consists of counting the number of 1s in several strings composed only of 0s and 1s. Simultaneously, there will be another box in the desktop window, in which subjects have to copy a given code if they want to pay the tax.
In the Automatic Payment Treatment, participants have the option of adhering to the automatic payment of the tax before starting the effort task. If they adhere to this system, during the effort task they will not have to enter the code because the tax will be automatically subtracted from their endowment. They will have to choose whether to keep the adhesion or leave the automatic system in each round, before starting the effort task.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization will happen during recruitment through ORSEE. We will identify a sample of eligible subjects and randomize them in the two treatments.
Randomization unit
Randomization at the individual level (participants).
Clusters
134 subjects.
Observations
134 subjects x 12 rounds = 1608 observations.
Arms
67 subjects per treatment.
Primary outcomes
The main outcome variable of the study is compliance at the individual level. With our design, we aim to measure the Average Treatment Effect of the automatic payment system on individual compliance. Furthermore, we can also estimate the ATE on tax revenue and individual earnings, to obtain valuable policy implications of the intervention.
Secondary outcomes
Performance in the real effort task. Risk aversion, measured with the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013), and its influence on the adhesion to the automatic payment system.

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Keywords