Automatic Payments and Tax Evasion: an experimental study
How to cite
Paoli, Damiano; Valori, Vincenzo; Pazienza, Maria Grazia; Colucci, Domenico. 2024. "Automatic Payments and Tax Evasion: an experimental study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013243. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13243-2.2
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study aims to assess the scope for a policy to increase tax compliance in the area of car tax, focusing on the case of the Tuscany regional administration in Italy. In particular the impact of automatic payment systems on tax evasion is the specific research goal of this paper. To this end we design a laboratory experiment where subjects play a Tax Evasion Game. Participants receive a fixed endowment and engage in a real effort task under time pressure where they have the opportunity to earn cash and are also simultaneously required to pay a tax, spending a portion of the available time to pay it successfully. While evading the tax offers a higher expected payoff, it also carries the risk of a significant fine if detected. In the intervention treatment, we introduce an automatic payment option, allowing participants to commit to the tax payment before beginning the effort task. We find that reducing the non-monetary burden significantly improves tax compliance. We also elicit risk aversion and find that it does not explain the observed treatment effect.
Intervention
We designed a Tax Evasion Game where subjects have to complete a real effort task under time pressure to obtain a payoff and simultaneously have to decide whether to pay or not a tax by inserting a code. The intervention introduced in one of the two treatments is an automatic payment option that allows participants to pay the tax automatically without inserting the code during the real effort task.
Experimental design
Participants receive an endowment m. They will have to carry out an activity that will require constant commitment (effort task) and that can generate a maximum income of 2m. In addition, at the same time as the effort task, they will also be required to pay a tax equal to the entire endowment m. If they don't pay it, they will be audited with a given probability and will pay a fine equal to m which is added to the entire tax, resulting in an outflow equal to 2m. The expected payoff of not paying the tax is positive.
The effort task is an activity that lasts 45 seconds and consists of counting the number of 1s in several strings composed only of 0s and 1s. Simultaneously, there will be another box in the desktop window, in which subjects have to copy a given code if they want to pay the tax.
In the Automatic Payment Treatment, participants have the option of adhering to the automatic payment of the tax before starting the effort task. If they adhere to this system, during the effort task they will not have to enter the code because the tax will be automatically subtracted from their endowment. They will have to choose whether to keep the adhesion or leave the automatic system in each round, before starting the effort task.
Design details
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