Technology Adoption and Public Good Provision: Evidence from Hillside Irrigation in Rwanda
How to cite
Kondylis, Florence; Loeser, John; Jones, Maria; Magruder, Jeremy. 2016. "Technology Adoption and Public Good Provision: Evidence from Hillside Irrigation in Rwanda." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001323. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1323-3.1
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
Irrigation investments have enormous potential to improve the lives of smallholder farmers who otherwise depend on rain-fed agriculture, through increasing yields, adding additional cultivating seasons, and reducing risk. Realizing these benefits often requires smallholders to simultaneously coordinate operations and maintenance (O&M) of the irrigation infrastructure and shift agricultural technologies. As a result, many of these investments are wasted due either to public goods market failures or limited adoption of new agricultural techniques. We simultaneously experimentally vary governance structures, access to complementary agricultural technologies, and the rollout of taxes on usage of the system within hillside irrigation schemes in Rwanda to test these hypothesized barriers to efficiency. Moreover, we exploit both a spatial discontinuity in the boundary of the schemes to evaluate the overall impact of access to irrigation. Lastly, we use variation in the nature of spillovers from both coordinating O&M and technology adoption driven by the size and composition of water user groups and the location of smallholder plots within each water user group to identify model driven effect heterogeneity.
Experimental design
O&M: Randomization at water user group (WUG) level. WUG monitor randomized. Irrigation/operator working for the government (status quo) with probability 2/5, monitor appointed by the WUG with probability 3/10, monitor appointed by the WUG with reservation for farmer who cultivates high on the secondary pipe with probability 3/10. Stratified by size-irrigation site. 10 WUG per strata.
Minikits: Minikits randomized at farmer level in saturation design across WUG. Minikits cross randomized with O&M. No minikits with probability 1/2, 10% of farmers receive minikits with probability 1/6, 30% of farmers receive minikits with probability 1/6, 70% of farmers receive minikits with probability 1/6. Within WUG minikits randomly distributed.
Fees: Fee subsidies randomized at farmer level. Farmers receive no subsidy with probability 2/5. Farmers receive a 50% subsidy in Season C 2016 with probability 1/5. Farmers receive a 100% subsidy in Season C 2016 with probability 1/5. Farmers receive a 100% subsidy in Season C 2016 and Season A 2017 with probability 1/5.
OI: Farmers with plots inside the irrigation scheme are compared to farmers with plots outside the irrigation scheme, conditional on the plots being within 100m (50m) of spatially discontinuous boundary of irrigation scheme.
Design details
Materials
Papers from this trial
- Jones, Maria, Florence Kondylis, John Loeser, and Jeremy Magruder. 2022. "Factor Market Failures and the Adoption of Irrigation in Rwanda." American Economic Review, 112 (7): 2316-52. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20210059
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.