Technology Adoption and Public Good Provision: Evidence from Hillside Irrigation in Rwanda

How to cite

Kondylis, Florence; Loeser, John; Jones, Maria; Magruder, Jeremy. 2016. "Technology Adoption and Public Good Provision: Evidence from Hillside Irrigation in Rwanda." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001323. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1323-3.1

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Florence Kondylis* , John Loeser , Maria Jones , Jeremy Magruder

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001323
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1323-3.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2015-08-10 – 2018-09-14
Countries
Rwanda (Karongi), Rwanda (Nyanza)
JEL codes
H41, O13, Q15
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1323

Abstract

Irrigation investments have enormous potential to improve the lives of smallholder farmers who otherwise depend on rain-fed agriculture, through increasing yields, adding additional cultivating seasons, and reducing risk. Realizing these benefits often requires smallholders to simultaneously coordinate operations and maintenance (O&M) of the irrigation infrastructure and shift agricultural technologies. As a result, many of these investments are wasted due either to public goods market failures or limited adoption of new agricultural techniques. We simultaneously experimentally vary governance structures, access to complementary agricultural technologies, and the rollout of taxes on usage of the system within hillside irrigation schemes in Rwanda to test these hypothesized barriers to efficiency. Moreover, we exploit both a spatial discontinuity in the boundary of the schemes to evaluate the overall impact of access to irrigation. Lastly, we use variation in the nature of spillovers from both coordinating O&M and technology adoption driven by the size and composition of water user groups and the location of smallholder plots within each water user group to identify model driven effect heterogeneity.

Experimental design

O&M: Randomization at water user group (WUG) level. WUG monitor randomized. Irrigation/operator working for the government (status quo) with probability 2/5, monitor appointed by the WUG with probability 3/10, monitor appointed by the WUG with reservation for farmer who cultivates high on the secondary pipe with probability 3/10. Stratified by size-irrigation site. 10 WUG per strata.
Minikits: Minikits randomized at farmer level in saturation design across WUG. Minikits cross randomized with O&M. No minikits with probability 1/2, 10% of farmers receive minikits with probability 1/6, 30% of farmers receive minikits with probability 1/6, 70% of farmers receive minikits with probability 1/6. Within WUG minikits randomly distributed.
Fees: Fee subsidies randomized at farmer level. Farmers receive no subsidy with probability 2/5. Farmers receive a 50% subsidy in Season C 2016 with probability 1/5. Farmers receive a 100% subsidy in Season C 2016 with probability 1/5. Farmers receive a 100% subsidy in Season C 2016 and Season A 2017 with probability 1/5.
OI: Farmers with plots inside the irrigation scheme are compared to farmers with plots outside the irrigation scheme, conditional on the plots being within 100m (50m) of spatially discontinuous boundary of irrigation scheme.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
O&M and minikit saturation are randomized at the water user group (WUG) level. Minikit provision conditional on saturation is randomized at the household level within WUG. Fee subsidy is randomized at the household level.
Clusters
210 water user groups
Observations
1695 farmers
Arms
O&M: 84/63/63 water user groups (WUG) in government worker as monitor/WUG appointed farmer as monitor/WUG appointed farmer as monitor with reservation for farmer near top of secondary pipe, respectively. Minikit: 105/35/35/35 water user groups (WUG) in 0% saturation/10% saturation/30% saturation/70% saturation. 1384/311 farmers don't receive/receive minikits. Fee: 678/339/339/339 farmers receive no subsidy/50% 2016 Season C subsidy/100% 2016 Season C subsidy/100% 2016 Season C subsidy and 100% 2017 Season A subsidy. OI: 666/766 (331/359) plots within 100m (50m) of discontinuity inside irrigation scheme/outside irrigation scheme.
Primary outcomes
Farmer welfare (yields, profits, labor use, land rentals, migration, and education), adoption of high value crops, O&M (access to irrigation).

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Jones, Maria, Florence Kondylis, John Loeser, and Jeremy Magruder. 2022. "Factor Market Failures and the Adoption of Irrigation in Rwanda." American Economic Review, 112 (7): 2316-52. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20210059

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Keywords