Team production: aligning targets and incentives
How to cite
Lanz, Bruno; Kandul, Serhiy. 2024. "Team production: aligning targets and incentives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013176. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13176-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We study how team production responds to the alignment of performance targets and incentives. We design a lab experiment in which teams of two players have to complete a real-effort task and can check the progress of their partner in real time ("Team" condition). We consider a set of treatments in which individuals are subject to both piece-rate incentives and to either individual or group-level targets. Our objective is to measure how alternative target and punishment schemes affect team effort, as measured by the experimental task.
Experimental design
This is a computerized lab experiment that will take place at the research laboratory of the University of Zurich. We will recruit a sample of participants from a population of students. Participants will be randomly allocated to one of the experimental conditions in a between-subject design. Upon arrival participants randomly draw a seat number and proceed to the respective cubical in the lab. They will then read the experimental instructions, sign a consent form, and answer a few comprehension questions. All participants who signed the form and answered the comprehension question will proceed to the experiment, i.e. will perform a real effort task. The experimental condition defines how the participants are compensated for their work: in addition to a fixed show-up fee, participants receive a performance-based payment, which depends on the outcome of the real effort task. After completing a task, participants are informed about their payment and asked to fill a short questionnaire.
Design details
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