Team production: aligning targets and incentives

How to cite

Lanz, Bruno; Kandul, Serhiy. 2024. "Team production: aligning targets and incentives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013176. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13176-1.0

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Bruno Lanz* , Serhiy Kandul

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013176
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13176-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-03-18 – 2024-03-21
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13176

Abstract

We study how team production responds to the alignment of performance targets and incentives. We design a lab experiment in which teams of two players have to complete a real-effort task and can check the progress of their partner in real time ("Team" condition). We consider a set of treatments in which individuals are subject to both piece-rate incentives and to either individual or group-level targets. Our objective is to measure how alternative target and punishment schemes affect team effort, as measured by the experimental task.

Experimental design

This is a computerized lab experiment that will take place at the research laboratory of the University of Zurich. We will recruit a sample of participants from a population of students. Participants will be randomly allocated to one of the experimental conditions in a between-subject design. Upon arrival participants randomly draw a seat number and proceed to the respective cubical in the lab. They will then read the experimental instructions, sign a consent form, and answer a few comprehension questions. All participants who signed the form and answered the comprehension question will proceed to the experiment, i.e. will perform a real effort task. The experimental condition defines how the participants are compensated for their work: in addition to a fixed show-up fee, participants receive a performance-based payment, which depends on the outcome of the real effort task. After completing a task, participants are informed about their payment and asked to fill a short questionnaire.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done by a computer in the lab.
Randomization unit
Participant
Clusters
About 400 individual participants (200 pairs).
Observations
About 400 individual participants (200 pairs)
Arms
About 100 participants for each group (50 pairs).
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome of the study is effort as measured by the experimental task.
Secondary outcomes
The secondary outcome is willingness to pay to select preferred treatment and fairness perceptions.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords