Connections between firms are critical for industrial upgrading and economic growth. One possible barrier to firm-to-firm matching is information frictions: firms may not know the potential suppliers and buyers, or the specific product they offer or demand. These frictions may be especially prominent for smaller firms run by lower-income owners, who lack business connections and networks.
In this project, we aim to understand whether trade fairs can reduce information frictions. By coordinating a centralized meeting point for buyers and suppliers in a specific industry, trade fairs aim to reduce search costs and facilitate matching among firms. To test the impact of attending trade fairs on firm-to-firm connections, we partner with FISA, and conduct a two-sided experiment at two large trade fairs in Chile: (1) Aquasur 2024, a large trade fair for the fishing industry held in Puerto Montt, Chile; (2) Expomin 2025, a large mining trade fair held in Santiago, Chile. For each fair, we will first solicit firms’ interest in participating in the fair via an online application to a raffle to win a subsidy to attend the fair. Among the firms that express interest, we will randomly provide a subsidy on the registration fee to encourage firms’ actual attendance at the fair. Finally, among participating firms, we will organize a matchmaking event at the fair to facilitate supplier-buyer connections.
We will measure impacts using a combination of original surveys of firms, collected both at the fair and after, with rich firm-to-firm transaction-level data from VAT tax records. First, we will measure how much reducing information frictions by bringing firms together at the fair facilitates new business connections. Second, we will assess whether the new supplier linkages substitute transactions from other suppliers, thereby testing the business-stealing effects. Third, we will study additional ripple effects of the new linkages to the economy, such as upstream and downstream propagation and firm-level quality upgrading. Finally, we will combine the reduced form findings from the experiment with a structural model, building on the approach in Baqaee, Burstein, Duprez, Farhi (2024), to quantify the value of new business linkages and how that impacts aggregate productivity and growth.
Intervention
This project studies the impact of trade fairs on reducing search costs that may limit firm-to-firm connections. To test the impact of attending trade fairs on firm-to-firm connections, we partner with FISA, the organizer of Aquasur 2024 and Expomin 2025. We will first solicit firms’ interest in participating in the fairs via an online application to a raffle to win a subsidy to attend the fair. Among the firms that express interest, we will randomly provide a subsidy on the registration fee to encourage firms’ actual attendance at the fairs. Finally, among participating firms, we will organize a matchmaking event at the fairs to facilitate supplier-buyer connections.
Experimental design
Our main experiment is to randomly provide a subsidy to encourage suppliers’ attendance at the fair. We recruit small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) who are potentially interested in attending the trade fair and would like to bring their products and services to showcase at the fair. We will randomly provide a subset of the suppliers with a 60% subsidy on their registration fee to encourage actual attendance at the fair. Using the randomized subsidy as an “encouragement design,” we will study the impact of attending the fair on business connections and firm outcomes.
We will also run a sub-experiment of “matchmaking program” at the fair to randomly reduce information friction between particular pairs of suppliers and buyers. Among the SME suppliers who decide to attend fair (as well as among a wider set of suppliers at the fair) and potential buyers at the fair (i.e., firms who sign up as visitors to the fair and will be primarily looking for suppliers at the fair), we will elicit their interest in participating in a matchmaking program at the fair. Among those who express interest, we will randomly form matched pairs of potential suppliers and buyers, based on the product information provided by the firms, and invite the matched pairs to attend a series of matchmaking meetings happening at the fair. Leveraging variation in the matching at the buyer-product level, we will assess whether the new supplier linkages substitute transactions from other suppliers, thereby testing the business-stealing effects.
Design details
Randomization method
For our main experiment to encourage suppliers to attend at the fair: Among the firms who fill out an online application to join the raffle, we first select small and medium-sized firms based on their employment size. We then stratify these firms based on their sales value and number of employees. We run the randomization in office by a STATA program. We will then inform the winner of the randomization and confirm their participation to the fair.
For our sub-experiment of matchmaking program: Once we have the list of buyer firm representatives and products they are in charge, we will randomly split them into “treatment,” who we invite to the program, and “control,” who we do not, at the level of buyer-product. For each treated buyer-product, we randomly assign suppliers that serve the corresponding product. The matchmaking program will consist of a series of one-on-one meetings between these matched pairs. Therefore, the randomization occurs at the level of the buyer-product and supplier level. We will then run the randomization in office by a STATA program.
Randomization unit
For our main experiment to encourage suppliers to attend at the fair: We randomize at the supplier firm level to select the winner of the raffle.
For our sub-experiment of matchmaking program: We implement the randomization in two steps. We first select the treatment buyer-product. Next, we randomly allocate suppliers that serve the corresponding product (as long as there are multiple suppliers within each category). Therefore, the randomization occurs at the level of the buyer-product and supplier level.
Clusters
For our main experiment to encourage suppliers to attend at the fair: We expect to have about 220 SME suppliers from Aquasur and 420 SME suppliers from Expomin, which constitutes our clusters.
For our sub-experiment of matchmaking program: We expect to have about 30-100 buyer-product pairs and 65-130 suppliers for Aquasur, and 80-250 buyer-product pairs and 100-125 suppliers for Expomin. For the outcome variables defined at the buyer-product and supplier pairs (e.g., whether a new transaction is initiated between the matched pair), we cluster our analysis at the combination of buyer-product and supplier level. For the outcome variables that are defined at the buyer-pair (e.g., the presence of a transaction with the preexisting supplier of the buyer firm within the same product category), we cluster our analysis at the buyer-product level.
Observations
For our main experiment to encourage suppliers to attend at the fair: We expect to draw our treatment suppliers from about 220 SME suppliers for Aquasur and 420 for Expomin. For outcome variables that are defined at the supplier-buyer-pair level (e.g., whether there is a new trade relationship, volume of transactions, prices), our observation is the number of SME suppliers times the number of potential buyers that appear in each of the trade fairs. In this case, we cluster standard errors at the supplier-level. For secondary outcome variables that are defined at the supplier level (e.g., sales, employment, profit), the unit of the observation corresponds to the number of suppliers participated in the randomization.
For our sub-experiment of matchmaking program: We expect to assign treatment matches from about 30-100 buyer-product and 65-130 suppliers at Aquasur, and 80-250 buyer-product pairs and 100-125 suppliers for Expomin. For the outcome variables defined at the buyer-product and supplier pairs (e.g., whether a new transaction is initiated between the matched pair), the unit of observations is the potential number of supplier-buyer matches. For outcome variables defined at the buyer-product-level (e.g., purchases of these products from new suppliers and preexisting suppliers), the unit of the observation corresponds to the number of buyer-product combination.
Arms
For Aquasur, we expect to recruit 220 SME suppliers to participate in the study, among which 110 will be randomly selected to receive the financial subsidy to attend the fair and we expect 65 of them to eventually take up the subsidy and attend the fair. The sub-experiment of matchmaking program will involve approximately 65-130 suppliers (those from the treatment group who take up the subsidy and some other suppliers who sign up on their own at full cost) and a subset of buyers who register (on their own) to attend the fair and express interest in the program – we expect that number to be 30-100 (maximum).
For Expomin, we expect to recruit 420 SME suppliers to participate in the study, among which 210 will be randomly selected to receive the financial subsidy to attend the fair and we expect 100-125 of them to eventually take up the subsidy and attend the fair. The sub-experiment of matchmaking program will involve approximately 100-125 suppliers and a subset of buyers who register (on their own) to attend the fair and express interest in the program – we expect that number to be 15 to 50 (with an average of 5 interested products per buyer firm).
Primary outcomes
To measure these outcomes, we will use comprehensive Value Added Tax (VAT) administrative data provided to the research team by the Central Bank of Chile. The data are collected electronically and provide rich transaction-level firm-to-firm information, including existing and new business connections, specific products and services traded, quantities, and prices. We will also measure the impacts on total sales, employment, profit, etc.
We will complement the administrative data with original firm surveys conducted during and after the trade fair to measure – on a buyer-supplier pair level – new introductions made and specifics discussed (e.g., samples shared, initial contracts signed, etc).
Our main outcome variables are whether attendance at the fair, as instrumented by receipt of the subsidy, leads to an initiation and strengthening the trade linkages. We measure these outcomes both for the extensive margin (presence of trade linkages) and intensive margin (quantity, products, prices). These outcome variables are measured at supplier-buyer pair level.
Secondary outcomes
Our secondary outcome variables are as follows. We measure these outcomes through VAT data and our original surveys as outlined in the “Primary Outcomes” section.
1. Supplier-level aggregate outcomes, such as sales, employment, and profit.
2. Intermediate steps to initiate new trade linkages, as measured in surveys, including business meetings, references checked, samples sent, etc. We rely on surveys for these outcomes.
3. For the sub-experiment of the matchmaking program, we will assess the impacts on transactions between the matched pairs, both extensive margin (presence of trade linkages) and intensive margin (quantity, products, prices). Furthermore, if we detect an increase in new supplier-buyer linkages, we assess whether the new supplier linkages substitute from other suppliers of the same product categories, thereby testing for any business-stealing effects.
4. Firm-level technology upgrading, as measured in surveys as well as from the purchases of capital goods and new goods and services from VAT data.
5. Upstream and downstream propagation effects, such as the impacts on suppliers of suppliers and buyers of buyers, as measured in the VAT data.
6. Ability to access international markets (importing and exporting).
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