Building state and citizenry: A randomized evaluation of a tax-collection campaign in the D.R. Congo
How to cite
Weigel, Jonathan. 2016. "Building state and citizenry: A randomized evaluation of a tax-collection campaign in the D.R. Congo." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001316. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1316-5.199999999999999
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The Provincial Government of Kasai Central, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is conducting its first citywide on-the-ground property and rental tax collection campaign in the provincial capital, Kananga. The primary intervention randomly assigns certain neighborhoods to receive this new door-to-door tax collection program, aided by tablet computers and handheld thermal receipt printers. Control neighborhoods remain in the existing regime, in which citizens are supposed to go to the tax ministry themselves to pay taxes (and as a result, tax payment is very low). This study attempts to measure the impact of the program on citizen beliefs about the government and citizen efforts to hold the government accountable. In other words, the study exploits random variation in taxes paid to examine the theorized link between taxation and civic engagement. Additionally, two cross-randomized interventions are used to study how to limit bribe taking among tax collectors administering this new program. First, a collector monitoring (“audit”) intervention is randomly assigned among neighborhoods that receive the on-the-ground taxation program. Second, a citizen-empowerment information intervention is randomly assigned among all neighborhoods in the city.
Intervention
The primary intervention randomly assigns certain neighborhoods to receive an on-the-ground property tax collection program, aided by tablet computers and handheld thermal receipt printers. This study will attempt to measure the impact of the program on citizen beliefs about the government and citizen efforts to hold the government accountable. Specifically, the study will exploit random variation in taxes paid to examine the theorized link between taxation and civic engagement. Additionally, two cross-randomized interventions will be used to study how to limit bribe taking among tax collectors administering this new program. First, a collector monitoring (“audit”) intervention will be randomly assigned among neighborhoods that receive the on-the-ground taxation program. Second, a citizen-empowerment information intervention will be randomly assigned among all neighborhoods in the city.
Experimental design
The information intervention will be administered in randomly selected neighborhoods during a baseline survey conducted before the start of the tax program. Audits will be administered in selected neighborhoods during the roll out of the program, which will take an estimated 6-8 months to complete. Collection of outcomes of the effects on citizens’ expectations of the governments and their efforts to hold it accountable will begin roughly 6 months after program roll out.
Design details
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