Building state and citizenry: A randomized evaluation of a tax-collection campaign in the D.R. Congo

How to cite

Weigel, Jonathan. 2016. "Building state and citizenry: A randomized evaluation of a tax-collection campaign in the D.R. Congo." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001316. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1316-5.199999999999999

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Jonathan Weigel*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001316
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1316-5.199999999999999
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2016-03-29 – 2017-12-22
Countries
Congo (Democratic Republic of the) (Africa)
JEL codes
H26, D73, P48
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1316

Abstract

The Provincial Government of Kasai Central, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is conducting its first citywide on-the-ground property and rental tax collection campaign in the provincial capital, Kananga. The primary intervention randomly assigns certain neighborhoods to receive this new door-to-door tax collection program, aided by tablet computers and handheld thermal receipt printers. Control neighborhoods remain in the existing regime, in which citizens are supposed to go to the tax ministry themselves to pay taxes (and as a result, tax payment is very low). This study attempts to measure the impact of the program on citizen beliefs about the government and citizen efforts to hold the government accountable. In other words, the study exploits random variation in taxes paid to examine the theorized link between taxation and civic engagement. Additionally, two cross-randomized interventions are used to study how to limit bribe taking among tax collectors administering this new program. First, a collector monitoring (“audit”) intervention is randomly assigned among neighborhoods that receive the on-the-ground taxation program. Second, a citizen-empowerment information intervention is randomly assigned among all neighborhoods in the city.

Intervention

The primary intervention randomly assigns certain neighborhoods to receive an on-the-ground property tax collection program, aided by tablet computers and handheld thermal receipt printers. This study will attempt to measure the impact of the program on citizen beliefs about the government and citizen efforts to hold the government accountable. Specifically, the study will exploit random variation in taxes paid to examine the theorized link between taxation and civic engagement. Additionally, two cross-randomized interventions will be used to study how to limit bribe taking among tax collectors administering this new program. First, a collector monitoring (“audit”) intervention will be randomly assigned among neighborhoods that receive the on-the-ground taxation program. Second, a citizen-empowerment information intervention will be randomly assigned among all neighborhoods in the city.

Experimental design

The information intervention will be administered in randomly selected neighborhoods during a baseline survey conducted before the start of the tax program. Audits will be administered in selected neighborhoods during the roll out of the program, which will take an estimated 6-8 months to complete. Collection of outcomes of the effects on citizens’ expectations of the governments and their efforts to hold it accountable will begin roughly 6 months after program roll out.

Design details

Randomization method
The random assignment of tax collection treatments to polygons will be conducted in Stata using a specified seed.
Randomization unit
The randomization unit for assigning the tax program, the audit treatment, and the information treatment is the polygon. As noted above polygons are drawn on a satellite map of the city. They follow geographic features that are easily distinguishable from the ground, i.e. streets, ravines, known city administrative boundaries, etc.
Clusters
The 431 polygons in the city of Kananga.
Observations
The midline sample will have nearly 30,000 observations. The endline sample will have nearly 3000 observations.
Arms
The distribution of sub-treatments across clusters (neighborhoods) is shown below. The tax program includes both the Audit and No Audit columns in the below, meaning that 253 of 431 neighborhoods were assigned to the Tax treatment. "Audit" "No Audit" "Control" Info 65 62 88 No Info 60 66 90
Primary outcomes
For the main intervention (random assignment of on-the-ground tax collection), the main outcome variables are as follows: - Tax receipts and government revenues: measured using official government data. - Citizen views about the provincial government: measured with survey questions - Citizen participation with provincial government: measured by attendance at townhall and submission of government evaluations For the cross-randomized interventions aimed at reducing corruption among tax collectors, outcome variables are as follows: - Availability of valid receipt: e.g. if a participant has a printed receipt from the program. - Discrepancies between citizen receipts and official program records: e.g. if a tax collector issues a receipt but does not submit this money to the tax ministry. - Discrepancies between the amounts citizens report paying and official program data: - The amount citizens report paying, including bribe amounts less than the official tax.
Secondary outcomes
See the analysis plan, as well as further information at jonathanweigel.com

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Keywords