Overbidding and Beliefs in Common-Value Auctions
How to cite
Breig, Zachary; Rosato, Antonio. 2024. "Overbidding and Beliefs in Common-Value Auctions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013159. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13159-1.1
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
We will study how beliefs affect behavior in common-value auctions. These are auctions in which all buyers have the same value for an object or set of objects (e.g. an oil field), but this value is unknown ex-ante and each buyer receives a different signal about the value. We will study how different incentive structures interact with the information subjects receive using an incentivized laboratory experiment.
Experimental design
We use a within-subject design to observe 1) how subjects bid when there is one prize and the price is the second highest bid, 2) how subjects bid when there are four prizes and the price is the fifth highest bid, and 3) how subjects' reservation values vary with their signal and with information about how their signal ranks against other buyers' signals.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.