Overbidding and Beliefs in Common-Value Auctions

How to cite

Breig, Zachary; Rosato, Antonio. 2024. "Overbidding and Beliefs in Common-Value Auctions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013159. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13159-1.1

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Zachary Breig* , Antonio Rosato

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013159
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13159-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2024-03-11 – 2024-05-31
Countries
Australia ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13159

Abstract

We will study how beliefs affect behavior in common-value auctions. These are auctions in which all buyers have the same value for an object or set of objects (e.g. an oil field), but this value is unknown ex-ante and each buyer receives a different signal about the value. We will study how different incentive structures interact with the information subjects receive using an incentivized laboratory experiment.

Experimental design

We use a within-subject design to observe 1) how subjects bid when there is one prize and the price is the second highest bid, 2) how subjects bid when there are four prizes and the price is the fifth highest bid, and 3) how subjects' reservation values vary with their signal and with information about how their signal ranks against other buyers' signals.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization will be completed using the experimental software.
Randomization unit
Groups and signals will be randomized within each round.
Clusters
100-120 subjects
Observations
20 rounds for each subject
Arms
We use a within-subject design
Primary outcomes
The key outcome variables are the bids in two different types of auctions and reservation values.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords