Asymmetric Information in Labor Contracts: Evidence from an Online Experiment
How to cite
Herbst, Daniel.
2024. "Asymmetric Information in Labor Contracts: Evidence from an Online Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013138.
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13138-2.0
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For short-term workers facing uncertain output, hourly wage contracts provide implicit insurance compared to self-employment or piece-rate pay. But like any insurance product, these contracts are prone to market distortions through moral hazard and adverse selection. Using a model of wage contracts under asymmetric information, I show how these distortions can be identified as potential outcomes in a marginal-treatment-effects framework. I apply this framework to a field experiment in which data-entry workers are offered a choice between a randomized hourly wage and a standardized piece rate. Using experimental wage offers as an instrument for hourly wage take-up identifies moral hazard, while comparisons between piece-rate workers who declined different wage offers identifies adverse selection.
Experimental design
My experimental design offers workers a choice between a randomized hourly wage and a standardized piece rate. Comparing realized output between individuals who faced different hourly wage offers but ultimately chose the common piece rate identifies adverse selection---both groups ultimately face the same compensation scheme but made decisions under different alternative options. So, if workers choose contracts based on their privately known productivities, those who decline more generous hourly payments should perform better than those foregoing more modest wages. At the same time, because I observe worker output under both contract choices in each treatment group, a standard two-stage-least-squares estimation allows me to separately identify treatment effects of hourly wages among those who accept the offer.
Design details
Randomization method
Because my experimental groups have different intended sample sizes, I split these groups into 60 smaller subgroups, so that each subgroup is intended to treat the same number of participants (50). I then use my office computer to place these 60 subgroups in random order, assigning a unique URL to each subgroup based on that randomized order. Then, on the Prolific platform, each participant is routed to an experimental condition using the URL corresponding to the order in which they click the job posting. The first participant is assigned URL 1, The second participant is assigned URL 2, etc. After the first 60 participants have been assigned URLs 1 through 60, the 61st participant is assigned URL 1 and the process starts over.
Because each participants can only access the URL to which their Prolific ID is assigned, this process prevents cross-treatment contamination. Treatment assignment using other methods (e.g. randomization in Qualtrics) can be manipulated by clearing browser histories, deleting cookies, or using VPNs.
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
3000
Note: I estimate a sample size of 3,000 participants will cost $6,600 using conservative predictions for participant take-up and performance across each treatment group. However, this estimate may be inaccurate. If piece-rate participants outperform expectations, or an unexpectedly large number of participants become eligible for the surprise top up, experimental costs may exceed my limited budget before reaching a sample size of 3,000. On the other hand, if participants underperform expectations, I may reach a sample size of 3,000 with excess funds to spare. I plan to adjust sample size as needed so that experimental costs remain between $5,000 and $8,000.
Observations
3000
Arms
300 No Hourly Offer (Control)
150 $1.20/hr Offer
150 $1.20/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
50 $1.80/hr Offer
50 $1.80/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
50 $2.40/hr Offer
50 $2.40/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
150 $3.00/hr Offer
150 $3.00/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
50 $3.60/hr Offer
50 $3.60/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
50 $4.20/hr Offer
50 $4.20/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
50 $4.80/hr Offer
50 $4.80/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
50 $5.40/hr Offer
50 $5.40/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
150 $6.00/hr Offer
150 $6.00/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
50 $7.20/hr Offer
50 $7.20/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
50 $8.40/hr Offer
50 $8.40/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
50 $9.60/hr Offer
50 $9.60/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
50 $10.80/hr Offer
50 $10.80/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
150 $12.00/hr Offer
150 $12.00/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
50 $15.00/hr Offer
50 $15.00/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
50 $18.00/hr Offer
50 $18.00/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus
300 $21.00/hr Offer
Note: Each participant is offered a choice between their treatment group's hourly offer (prorated to five minutes) or a $0.03 piece rate. The "Surprise Bonus" condition, which raises effective wages to parity with the $21.00/hr offer, is only applied to participants who accept their hourly wage offer. Participants in the "$3.00/hr Offer + Surprise Bonus" group who decline their hourly offer in favor of the $0.03 piece rate will never see a "surprise bonus," and their treatment will be identical to decliners in the "$3.00/hr Offer" group.
Primary outcomes
The main outcome of interest is the number of correctly completed sentences, normalized to be in value-per-hour terms (i.e. Y = number of sentences X $0.03 X 60min/5min).
Secondary outcomes
I will also be measuring the number of attempted (correct + incorrect) sentences.
Papers from this trial
Herbst, Daniel, Asymmetric Information in Wage Contracts: Evidence from an Online Experiment (February 01, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5052461 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5052461
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5052461
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