Workers and firms in low and middle-income countries operate in a credit-constrained environment characterized by asymmetric information. Firms are unaware of the productivity and trustworthiness of the worker, and workers are unsure whether the firms will pay them on time or at all. Neither the worker nor the firm can commit to a contract. Theory suggests that a consequence of these market failures and the firm's own credit constraints is that firms should offer back-loaded contracts. We will test this theoretical prediction in an experiment where we offer to hire workers for firms with different payment structures. Workers dislike back-loaded contracts because they can't trust the firm to abide by them (due to limited commitment on the firm side) and due to consumption credit constraints. We will test this hypothesis in a take-up experiment where we offer real contracts of different lengths and payment structures to a random sample of workers. Our experiment will disentangle the effect of credit constraints and information asymmetry on the take-up of jobs by workers. Workers and firms who agree to take up the contracts will be matched with each other. The effects of contract structure on worker productivity, worker-firm disagreements will be measured.
Experimental design
The workers are cross-randomized into treatments which offer a job, with or without insurance against wage theft, and with or without back-loading of wages.
The firms are offered contracts which provide compensation against worker separation or not, credit to pay workers or not, and with or without back-loading of wages.
Firms and workers which accept the contracts are matched with each other.
Design details
Randomization method
Worker side: A Unique ID with treatment cells randomly allocated to them is created in the office. Enumerators recruit the workers in the order of unique id.
Firm side: We randomize the order in which questions are asked. This is done in the office.
Randomization unit
Randomization on the worker and firm side is done at the individual level.
Workers and firms which accept contracts within a treatment cell are matched with each other randomly to each other.
Clusters
We will cluster at the individual level for the firms as we observe them hiring more than one workers, and because we offer them more than one contracts to hire workers on.
Observations
Workers: Approximately 2000.
Each worker has a 25% probability of being given a job (for each contract they are offered).
Firms: Up to 800
There is a possibility that we might not be able to reach 2000 workers. Similarly, number of firms may be below 800.
Arms
Workers
For the first 300-500 workers we will use the following sample size
1) Daily payment*uninsured* 3 day contracts: 15%
2) Steep Back-loaded* uninsured * 3 day contracts: 15%
3) Smooth Back-loaded* uninsured * 3 day contracts: 20%
4) Steep Back-loaded* insured * 3 day contracts: 20%
5) Smooth Back-loaded* insured * 3 day contracts: 20%
6) Daily payment*insured* 3 day contracts: 10%
For the remaining 1300-1500 sample we will offer each worker two contracts, one of which will be a 3 day contract and other will be a 7 day contract. The break up of 3 day contracts will be the same as above and the breakup of 7 day contract sample is below:
1) Daily payment*uninsured* 7 day contracts: 15%
2) Steep Back-loaded* uninsured * 7 day contracts: 15%
3) Smooth Back-loaded* uninsured * 7 day contracts: 20%
4) Steep Back-loaded* insured * 7 day contracts: 20%
5) Smooth Back-loaded* insured * 7 day contracts: 20%
6) Daily payment*insured* 7 day contracts: 10%
Firms:
Each firm will be offered 12-16 different contracts, one of which will be randomly chosen and implemented.
Primary outcomes
1) Job take-up on the worker side
2) Take-up of contracts on the firm side
Secondary outcomes
1) Type of worker and take-up of jobs by different types of worker
2) Type of firm and acceptance of offers by different types of firms
3) Worker productivity at the work site
4) Worker-firm disagreements.
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