Challenges for the Welfare State: Tax Evasion and Preferences for Redistribution

How to cite

Foremny, Dirk; Molis, Elena; Solano-García, Ángel; Jiménez-Jiménez, Natalia. 2024. "Challenges for the Welfare State: Tax Evasion and Preferences for Redistribution." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013081. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13081-1.0

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Dirk Foremny* , Elena Molis , Ángel Solano-García , Natalia Jiménez-Jiménez

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013081
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13081-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-05-19 – 2024-06-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13081

Abstract

The main objective of this project is to study how perception of tax compliance affects preferences for the size of the welfare state and for income redistribution. Using a large-scale survey experiment, we test whether giving individuals information about tax evasion reduces their bias on this topic and changes their attitudes towards tax fraud, the support of the welfare state and the desired degree of progressivity of the tax system. In particular, we check if detailed information about the differences in the level tax evasion across individuals with different income alter their preferences.

Intervention

This project is built on a large-scale survey experiment to be implemented in Spain. We implement a conventional pre-post information treatment, which exposes randomly selected survey participants to information about the magnitude of tax evasion in the personal income tax.

We measure the knowledge participants have before the experimental intervention, and repeat similar questions after, to measure to which extend the treated participants updated their beliefs (see Experimental Design).

We also randomize when participants are asked about trust in people and politicians before and after the other treatment interventions mentioned above to test weather priming effects on this dimension play a role.

We leverage participants' responses to different questions on preferences for redistribution to measure how important the dimension of lost revenues due to tax evasion is (see Outcomes below).

Experimental design

We randomize the information provided to respondents in four groups. Control) does not receive any information; B) information about mean tax evasion in Spain; C) same as B + information about number of primary care doctors which could be hired with the evaded amount; and D) same as C + information about mean tax evasion in Spain of the 0.1\% richest citizens.

The priming on the trust dimension will be randomized across all treatments.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is technically implemented by the survey provider.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization is the individual respondent.
Clusters
The survey includes quotas to guarantee to be representative with population characteristics gender, age, region of residence dimension. The planned number of clusters is around 8.650 individuals. 1.000 observations will be used in a pilot. Our final sample will consist of 8.650 observations. These are distributed equally among the treatment arms (and control group).
Observations
The planned number of clusters is around 8.650 individuals. 1.000 observations will be used in a pilot. Our final sample will consist of 8.650 observations. These are distributed equally among the treatment arms (and control group).
Arms
The planned number of clusters is around 8.650 individuals. 1.000 observations will be used in a pilot. Our final sample will consist of 8.650 observations. These are distributed equally among the treatment arms (and control group).
Primary outcomes
The key outcome variables of the experiment are views on tax evasion, it's justification, and different dimensions which reflect individuals views on the support of the welfare state and the desired degree of progressivity of the tax system.
Secondary outcomes
Using the same questions as above, as secondary outcomes we aim at estimating treatment effects conditional on the priming on trust.

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Keywords