Focal Points in Experimental All-pay and Winner-pay Pooled Auctions with Similar Items
How to cite
Hsu, Dexter; Wang, Joseph Tao-yi. 2024. "Focal Points in Experimental All-pay and Winner-pay Pooled Auctions with Similar Items." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013079. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13079-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We plan to compare first-price and all-pay auctions with two units sold, and observe the effect of focal points on bidding, revenue and efficiency. Specifically, we plan to conduct laboratory experiments, in which each session has 6 bidders drawing private values independently (for each period) and competing to win one of two prizes, with the second prize valued at a fraction (80%, 40%, 20% etc.) of the first prize. The risk neutral Bayesian Nash equilibrium (RNBNE) predicts revenue equivalence and both formats being efficient. However, experimental results would likely be affected by the fraction (80%, 40%, 20% etc.), becoming bidding focal points. If this occurs, the first-price auction would yield higher revenue compared to the all-pay auction, and have efficiency levels closer to 100%. In contrast, the single-unit, first-price auction does not have such focal points, and would likely result in lower (first-prize) revenue and efficiency than all-pay, since bidders tend to overbid in all-pay auctions.
Experimental design
We adopt a focal point set Λ = {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8, 1}, creating a total of 5 experimental treatments.
For each treatment, we recruit 36 subjects, randomly distributed across 6 experimental groups.
Among the six groups, three groups experience all-pay auctions first (“All-Pay × Winner-Pay”),
and the other three experience winner-pay auctions first (“Winner-Pay × All-Pay”). This design
allows us to investigate how the magnitude of λ affects participants’ bidding behavior in winner-
pay and all-pay auctions. Additionally, it facilitates an exploration of the potential order effect.
Design details
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