Technology Adoption under Emissions Taxes and Permit Markets with Price Collars
How to cite
Cason, Timothy; Stranlund, John; Vries, Frans de. 2024. "Technology Adoption under Emissions Taxes and Permit Markets with Price Collars." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013060. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13060-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This lab experiment investigates how price controls in emissions permit markets affect incentives for the adoption of new technology that lowers abatement costs. A theoretical model shows that the investment incentives depend on (i) the specific placement of the price collar (defined by price ceilings and floors) and (ii) the size (width) of the collar. The experimental setting includes uncertainty in emissions and abatement costs, and heterogeneous firms. Firms are more likely to adopt the new technology when the collar raises the expected permit price relative to a no-price-control baseline, especially when the high collar is narrow. Conversely, adoption incentives are weaker when the collar lowers the expected permit price, especially when the low collar is narrow. Prices are determined using a uniform price, sealed bid auction. In the narrow collar treatments, the experiment implements the narrowest range possible—a fixed price equivalent to an emissions tax.
Intervention
Interventions include 5 different treatments, all featuring different types of price controls: A no-control baseline, a high collar raising the expected permit price, a low collar lowering the expected permit price, and two variants of emission taxes (high and low) with a collar width of zero.
Experimental design
This is a laboratory experiment, conducted in a standard university experimental economics lab, recruiting students broadly across the university. Subjects will be randomly assigned to treatments, and then randomly assigned to heterogenous firm types (8 firms per market) that remain constant throughout the experiment.
Permits are auctioned each period, and firms can reduce their abatement costs by purchasing more permits in the auction. They submit bid schedules, specifying different per-unit prices for various quantities of permits. Bid prices are constrained by the price controls implemented for each treatment. Firms can also incur a fixed (binary) investment cost to implement a new technology that lowers their entire abatement cost schedule. The permit price is determined with a uniform price (last accepted bid) rule. Subjects receive feedback at the end of every period, indicating their incurred abatement costs, permit expenditures, earnings, and permit price. They make investment decisions and auction bids across 20 periods of stationary repetition, following an initial practice period.
Design details
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