Technology Adoption under Emissions Taxes and Permit Markets with Price Collars

How to cite

Cason, Timothy; Stranlund, John; Vries, Frans de. 2024. "Technology Adoption under Emissions Taxes and Permit Markets with Price Collars." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013060. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13060-1.0

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Timothy Cason* , John Stranlund , Frans de Vries

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013060
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13060-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-02-21 – 2024-09-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C90, D44, H23
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13060

Abstract

This lab experiment investigates how price controls in emissions permit markets affect incentives for the adoption of new technology that lowers abatement costs. A theoretical model shows that the investment incentives depend on (i) the specific placement of the price collar (defined by price ceilings and floors) and (ii) the size (width) of the collar. The experimental setting includes uncertainty in emissions and abatement costs, and heterogeneous firms. Firms are more likely to adopt the new technology when the collar raises the expected permit price relative to a no-price-control baseline, especially when the high collar is narrow. Conversely, adoption incentives are weaker when the collar lowers the expected permit price, especially when the low collar is narrow. Prices are determined using a uniform price, sealed bid auction. In the narrow collar treatments, the experiment implements the narrowest range possible—a fixed price equivalent to an emissions tax.

Intervention

Interventions include 5 different treatments, all featuring different types of price controls: A no-control baseline, a high collar raising the expected permit price, a low collar lowering the expected permit price, and two variants of emission taxes (high and low) with a collar width of zero.

Experimental design

This is a laboratory experiment, conducted in a standard university experimental economics lab, recruiting students broadly across the university. Subjects will be randomly assigned to treatments, and then randomly assigned to heterogenous firm types (8 firms per market) that remain constant throughout the experiment.
Permits are auctioned each period, and firms can reduce their abatement costs by purchasing more permits in the auction. They submit bid schedules, specifying different per-unit prices for various quantities of permits. Bid prices are constrained by the price controls implemented for each treatment. Firms can also incur a fixed (binary) investment cost to implement a new technology that lowers their entire abatement cost schedule. The permit price is determined with a uniform price (last accepted bid) rule. Subjects receive feedback at the end of every period, indicating their incurred abatement costs, permit expenditures, earnings, and permit price. They make investment decisions and auction bids across 20 periods of stationary repetition, following an initial practice period.

Design details

Randomization method
Subjects will be recruited by email using ORSEE. They choose between a list of available sessions, and the session is randomized to a treatment before it is initialized.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
30 groups of 8 subjects
Observations
240 individuals
Arms
48 individuals (6 groups) in each of the 5 treatments.
Primary outcomes
Investment frequency Investment likelihood for different firm types, as high and low cost types are predicted to invest in different treatments Auction (clearing) prices, which depend in equilibrium on investment decisions and random abatement cost shocks. Note: Treatment comparisons will be made after dropping the initial adjustment periods, as is common in market experiments.
Secondary outcomes
Total emissions Convergence speed of investments towards equilibrium levels. Convergence speed of auction prices towards equilibrium levels.

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Keywords