Strategic Allocations in Weighted Networks

How to cite

Corrales, Sebastian Cortes; Arjona, David Rojo. 2024. "Strategic Allocations in Weighted Networks." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013059. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13059-1.0

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Sebastian Cortes Corrales* , David Rojo Arjona

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013059
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13059-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-03-07 – 2025-03-07
Countries
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ()
JEL codes
C35; C91; D74
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13059

Abstract

This project aims to investigate how individuals allocate scarce resources across differently weighted connections within networks. Existing literature highlights the effect of influential, resilient, or valuable connections on decision-making. However, empirical evidence in this area is lacking. Utilizing economic experiments, we seek to explore this phenomenon, contributing both theoretically and experimentally. We have designed a novel experiment to induce weighted networks and analyze allocations in various conflict scenarios. Our methodology ensures unique equilibrium predictions, eliminating potential confounds. Our study's findings will be disseminated widely, enriching the understanding of actual strategic resource allocation in network contexts.

Experimental design

Our experiment implements a series of decision problems in networks of bilateral conflicts. Each connection represents a bilateral conflict between two rivals, and a connection weight represents the value of winning that conflict. To win a conflict, agents simultaneously allocate a scarce resource (i.e., budget of 100 tokens) across their rivals. The value of the remaining budget, which is not allocated, is normalized to zero. The winner of each conflict is determined by a lottery contest success function, where an additional unit of resources allocated to a given conflict increases the likelihood of wining that conflict.

In every decision problem, each subject is matched to another three players at random. The experiment consists of 4 blocks of 18 decision problems each. Within a block, subjects face different decision problems each one associated to a different position in various networks. In particular, we consider six non-isomorphic strongly connected network structures that can be built with a set of four nodes (i.e., complete, diagonal, kite, ring, line, and star networks). Across blocks, the only change is the value of the connection between nodes 2 and 3 while all other values remains the same (300 points). The value of the connection changing across blocks is either 300, 600, 900, or 1200 points. And the order in which subjects face these values is randomized for every session.

Design details

Randomization method
All randomizations are done by the computer.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization is at the experimental session level and individual level.
Clusters
N/A
Observations
10,368 observations.
Arms
144 participants (9 sessions each with 16 participants).
Primary outcomes
1) Individual allocation per decision-problem. 2) Average allocation per decision-problem.
Secondary outcomes
1) Individual expected payoff per decision-problem. 2) Average expected payoff per decision-problem.

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Keywords