Adapting Economic Games to Personalize Privacy Nudges

How to cite

Wang, Qingyi; Chen, Yan; Adar, Eytan. 2024. "Adapting Economic Games to Personalize Privacy Nudges." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012875. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12875-1.4

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Qingyi Wang* , Yan Chen , Eytan Adar

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012875
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12875-1.4
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-09-01 – 2024-06-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D83, D91
Secondary IDs
NSF Grant 2209507
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12875

Abstract

Modern social communication systems–ranging from email to social media systems–present a dizzying number of decisions for users. Privacy configurations, when not hidden by social media companies, are opaque. Individuals sometimes are also not aware of the externality that their sharing decisions can have to others. Thus, it is often hard for individuals to react or behave in ways that model the personal behaviors or are communally advantageous. Personalized recommendations, interfaces, interventions or nudges can help but implementing these requires an understanding end-user preferences. Our research seeks to tackle this challenge by modeling individual preferences through the use of economic games, both in a neutral context and in specific scenarios. Simultaneously, we will collect user preferences in actual social and communication systems. We propose to connect the game-modeled behaviors with real-world preferences. Doing so will allow us to create interventions that can help align interface settings with real preferences or can nudge towards better decisions.

Intervention

We exogenously vary the correlation coefficient between one's own information and their match's information, as well as the payment provided for sharing the information, to observe how participants change their information-sharing decisions in both neutral contexts and real life scenarios.

Experimental design

The experiment has three modules:
The first module is an information sharing game. We test a simplified version of the Acemoglu et al. (2022) model in neutral contexts.
The second module introduces friend decision making. We assign specific real-life scenarios based on a similar game structure as the first module.
Last, we elicit participants' risk/ambiguity/social preferences using standard economic games, and investigate whether participants' information-sharing decisions in the first two modules can be predicted by the game outcomes.

Design details

Randomization method
First, the two versions of the information sharing game (with or without the average payoff matrices) are randomly assigned to each experiment session. Second, at the beginning of each experiment session, participants randomly draw a card to decide their participant label in the session. Third, in the information sharing game, we do complete random rematching in each round using oTree, to make sure that participants are never matched with the same participant again.
Randomization unit
The randomization of game versions is at the session level. The randomization of participant labels and the random rematching in the game are at the individual level.
Clusters
We plan to conduct 20 sessions of the experiment.
Observations
We plan to recruit 240 participants in total, where there are 12 in each session.
Arms
Out of the 20 sessions, 10 sessions will be assigned with the version where participants see the average payoff matrices first, and 10 sessions will be assigned with the version where participants make their own decisions first.
Primary outcomes
In the information sharing game, the primary outcome is the likelihood that participants select the best responses given by the realized payoff matrices. In the friend decision making module. the primary outcome is the willingness to accept to announce answers elicited by the BDM method.
Secondary outcomes
In the information sharing game, the secondary outcomes are (1) the likelihood that participants select the mutual best responses given by the realized payoff matrices; (2) payoffs; (3) efficiency

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Keywords