Leadership quality trade-off and vote buying: Evidence from the world’s third largest democracy
How to cite
Shofia, Naila; Stanig, Piero. 2024. "Leadership quality trade-off and vote buying: Evidence from the world’s third largest democracy." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012872. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12872-1.1
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
We study the role of the lay conception of democracy in voting behaviour in the context of the 2024 general election in Indonesia. We hypothesise that democracy’s shortcomings might be due to voters inaccurately understanding what the function of democratic elections is, and hence, which candidate qualities they should consider when casting a vote. We carry out a large three-wave panel survey with a representative sample of Indonesian voters with almost four thousand respondents. We randomly assigned information treatment: In the treatment condition, respondents watch an educational animated video explaining the accountability conception of democracy using a metaphor easy to grasp for a layperson. In the control condition, neutral information about general election eligibility and procedures is provided, in a visual format identical to the treatment video. We study a number of outcomes: Preferences regarding leadership qualities, vote buying, and dynasty politics. To measure preferences, we use a conjoint experiment in which respondents choose between fifteen pairs of fully randomised hypothetical legislative candidate profiles. We then estimate how the randomised informational treatment affects the relative weights respondents place on identity markers vis a vis valence and policy positions. Moreover, two list experiments are used to gauge evidence about the prevalence of vote buying during the campaign and in the actual general election. We then estimate whether the informational treatment reduces vote buying and compliance. Finally, we also attempt to understand whether and how much holding an incumbent presidential position leads to an advantage for one’s progeny who are running in a presidential election and gauge whether information treatment changes voter acceptance to dynasty politics.
Intervention
Behavioural intervention: We randomly assign informational treatments. In the treatment condition, respondents watch an educational animated video explaining the accountability conception of democracy using a metaphor easy to grasp for a layperson. In one control condition, neutral information about general election eligibility and procedures is provided, in a visual format identical to the treatment video. In a second control condition, respondents do not watch any video.
Measurement intervention: Apart from the behavioral intervention above, we use different methods to experimentally measure the outcomes of interest. First, to measure preferences regarding leadership quality, we are using a conjoint experiment. In this experiment, respondents choose between fifteen pairs of fully randomized hypothetical legislative candidate profiles. Demographic characteristics, identities (religion and ethnicity), valence, and position on divisive issues are randomly assigned to profiles.
Second, we are using list experiment to measure the prevalence of vote buying during the campaign period as well as during the actual election. In list experiment, respondents are asked to state the number of activities they see or experienced from the list we provide them. The experiment randomly vary the number of activities listed for different group. The list given to the control and the treatment group are exactly similar except that the treatment group will also receive a sensitive item in their list (vote buying activities). The magnitude of vote buying is measured by comparing the average number of values stated in the treatment and the control group.
(Previously hidden details of intervention): The explain the accountability conception of democratic election, we use a metaphor of a person who inherit a convenient store from his grandparents but then need to hire someone else to manage the store. Store manager will run the store on behalf of the owner, and hence act as an agent for the principal (store owner). This type of principal-agent relationship is how, we try to convince the respondents, we suppose to look at the relationship between voters and their representatives in the legislative body.
Experimental design
From the pool sample of respondents collected in the baseline (wave 1), the treatment is assigned as follows:
- Wave 2 (Pre-election survey): 2700 respondents will be assigned to the conjoint experiment, while the rest--900 respondents will be assigned to the list experiment. Half of respondents in each experiment will be assigned to the treatment video, while the other half will be assigned to the control video (1800 respondents in total in each treatment)
Wave 3 (Post-election survey): 2700 respondents who were previously assigned to the conjoint experiment will receive the list experiment in this wave. Unlike the pre-election list experiment, this experiment will have three treatment arms: control, treatment 1, and treatment 2. Meanwhile, 900 respondents who were previously assigned to the list experiment will receive the conjoint experiment in this wave. There will be no additional video treatment in this wave, the effect will rely of the treatment the respondents received in the previous wave (pre-election survey)
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.