Outcome- and Input-Based Incentives: Evidence from the Municipal Incentive Program in Peru

How to cite

Quispe, Sarita Patricia Oré. 2024. "Outcome- and Input-Based Incentives: Evidence from the Municipal Incentive Program in Peru." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012869. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12869-1.0

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Sarita Patricia Oré Quispe*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012869
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12869-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-03-01 – 2025-06-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12869

Abstract

Designing successful incentive schemes is challenging in the developing world. What can be done to motivate public providers to deliver quality services? Deciding whether to contract based on inputs or outcomes, or where to allocate the incentive across the hierarchy of an organization is not trivial. I will implement a large field experiment to test whether the efforts of the top-layer and lower-tier agents change in response to their type of incentive contract (input- or outcome-based). I will also test for complementarities among different levels of the organization hierarchy and the effect of incentive allocation and type of incentive contract on the desirable outcomes. I will study this in the context of Peru, where 60% of children aged six months are anemic, and where the local governments are incentivized to conduct home visits to educate families on how to prevent and reduce anemia.

Experimental design

Local governments are assigned to four groups: 1) incentive contract based on inputs and training, 2) incentive contract based on inputs and no training, 3) incentive contract based on outcomes and training, and 4) incentive contract based on outcomes and no training.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Unit of randomization is a local government. I use an indicator for high vs low rurality and an indicator for high vs low GBV anemia prevalence at baseline as randomization strata.
Clusters
784 local governments
Observations
784 local governments
Arms
There will be four treatment arms: 1. Input-based incentives + workshop on managerial practices: 135 local governments 2. Input-based incentives + without workshop on managerial practices: 135 local governments 3. Outcome-based incentives + workshop on managerial practices: 258 local governments 4. Outcome-based incentives + without workshop on managerial practices: 256 local governments
Primary outcomes
Local governments' managerial practices
Secondary outcomes
Health outcomes of children

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords