Learning Effects in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in School Choice

How to cite

Herzog, Sabrina. 2024. "Learning Effects in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in School Choice." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012834. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12834-1.0

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Sabrina Herzog*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012834
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12834-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-08-15 – 2024-11-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C78, C91, D47, I29
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12834

Abstract

Improving the matching of students to schools has been the subject of much research in recent years. Since school choice can have a long-lasting educational impact on individuals’ lives, the mechanism determining the matching should be chosen with care. One property that researchers and policymakers have agreed on being desirable is that the matching mechanism in an educational setting should be strategy-proof in order to give applicants fair chances to submit their preferences over schools. Faced with a strategy-proof matching mechanism, it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for applicants to submit their true preferences. However, empirical evidence has shown that people fail to understand strategy-proofness and instead try to strategically manipulate their preference submissions.
Two common mechanisms that fulfill this property are the Deferred-Acceptance (DA) mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. The discussion around which mechanism is best to implement often favors the DA mechanism. Much of the research is concerned with making strategy-proofness clearer to applicants and to adjust the application procedure to facilitate truthful preference submission. What is less clear, however, is how good individuals are at learning how to participate in either mechanism. What if it turns out that individuals are much better at learning how to participate in the TTC than the DA mechanism? Since parents often have to make school choice decisions multiple times (e.g., for several levels of education such as kindergarten, primary school, secondary school, etc., or if they have more than one child), the comprehension of learning effects allows for a broader overall understanding of how people behave in these decisions.
This project aims to investigate learning effects in a laboratory experiment and to re-evaluate the DA and TTC mechanism in terms of comprehensibility and learning behavior. In 20 rounds, students are matched in groups of four and have to decide on their preference submissions in an artificial school choice setting where they compete over four schools. The matching outcome is determined by either the DA or the TTC mechanism. In addition to comparing learning effects in the DA versus TTC mechanism, measured as increases in truth-telling rates, in a second treatment variation advice is added on the dominant strategy (submitting preferences truthfully). This allows for an analysis of the extent to which improvements are due to learning versus advice. A subsequent survey on subjects' strategies, and economic and socio-economic preferences is intended to help deepen the understanding of the findings.

Intervention

Four experimental treatments: Deferred-Acceptance mechanism (with and without advice) and Top-Trading-Cycles mechanism (with and without advice) (see experimental design)

Experimental design

The laboratory experiment will be conducted in a between-subject design with four treatments. In each treatment, students are randomly assigned to groups of four and are asked to submit an application form to a centralized school admission authority in 20 rounds of an artificial school choice problem in which they compete for four schools with one seat each. Students are randomly reassigned to groups of four after each round of matching. To simplify the experiment for students, each student is assigned a color and remains with that color throughout the experiment. Preferences over schools are induced by the payoffs that students can receive when they are matched to a school. One round out of 20 is randomly selected to be payoff relevant at the end of the experiment.

The matching of students to schools is determined by either the Deferred-Acceptance (DA) mechanism or the Top-Trading-Cycles (TTC) mechanism (1st treatment variation). In addition to the preference rankings submitted by the students, the mechanisms determine the matching outcomes using priority rankings that prioritize the four students at each school. The priority rankings are not known to the students. The priority rankings of students at schools as well as the induced preference order of students over schools change in each round, so that students face a new matching problem in each round. Following Chen & Sönmez (2006), preference orders are determined by a utility function that includes artificial utilities for school proximity and school quality, and a random factor to capture diversity in tastes. For the priority ranking, each student is prioritized at one school, while the priority over the other students is randomly determined for all schools. In each round, each student is prioritized at a different school, to support equal chances of being assigned to the more preferred schools.

The aim of the experiment is to measure learning effects over the 20 rounds in both mechanisms by assessing the truth-telling rates in each round. By comparing the evolution of truth-telling rates in the DA vs. the TTC mechanism, the two strategy-proof mechanisms, can be evaluated in terms of their learning effects. In addition, students may receive advice on the (weakly) dominant submission strategy, i.e. to submit preferences truthfully (2nd treatment variation). This allows to analyze the effect of learning compared to the effect of advice (in both mechanisms). Students receive feedback on their own matching outcome in each round.

After the repeated school choice problem, students in all treatments are asked to complete a survey. I collect the following measures: their submission strategies, understanding of the optimal strategy (truth-telling), perceived fairness, perceived efficiency, and perceived understandability of the mechanism, trust (in general, in the mechanism, and in institutions), IQ (proxied through highest school-leaving certificate, last math grade and three items of a Cognitive Reflection Test), risk preferences, loss aversion in risky choices, and some demographic characteristics.

Design details

Randomization method
Subjects who sign up for the experiment randomly receive a seat number before entering the laboratory. Otherwise, randomization is done by a computer.
Randomization unit
experimental sessions
Clusters
planned are five clusters per treatment
Observations
up to 256 students in four treatments
Arms
up to 64 students in DA without advice, up to 64 students in DA with advice, up to 64 students in TTC without advice, up to 64 students in TTC with advice
Primary outcomes
Truth-telling rates in Deferred-Acceptance mechanism (with or without advice) and Top-Trading-Cycles mechanism (with or without advice)

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Keywords