Payoffs, Beliefs, and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games

How to cite

Nithammer, Juri; Bruttel, Lisa; Andres, Maximilian. 2024. "Payoffs, Beliefs, and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012816. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12816-2.0

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Juri Nithammer* , Lisa Bruttel , Maximilian Andres

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012816
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12816-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2024-01-14 – 2024-02-13
Countries
Germany (Potsdam)
JEL codes
C72, C73, D81, D83
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12816

Abstract

This is the preregistration of a laboratory experiment designed as an empirical test of our paper ``Payoffs, Beliefs, and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games," available at SSRN 4491762.

The accompanying document contains a detailed description of the experimental design and procedures, the hypotheses and planned statistical analysis, the results of the power analysis, as well as the instructions from the experiment.

Intervention

In our model (see Andres et al., 2023), we show that a player's belief about the probability of cooperation by their opponent moderates the effect of changes in the payoff parameters on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma. If beliefs are optimistic, increasing the gain from unilateral defection has a large negative effect on cooperation, while increasing the loss from unilateral cooperation has a negligible effect. However, if beliefs are pessimistic, increasing the gain has only a negligible effect, while increasing the loss has a large negative effect on cooperation.

Participants in the experiment face different versions of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We induce beliefs by informing participants truthfully that we will match them to a partner only after they have chosen their strategy in the infinitely repeated game and by telling them ex ante the probability that we will match them to a partner who plays Grim or AlwaysDefect, respectively.

For more details, see the accompanying document.

Experimental design

All participants choose strategies in three different prisoner's dilemma games that vary the stage-game payoff-parameters. Participants play infinitely repeated versions of all three games. For each of the stage-games, participants choose among the two strategies Grim and AlwaysDefect. They make this choice for nine possible discount factors {0.1,...,0.9}. We compare three treatments in which beliefs vary exogenously between participants.

For more details, including details of the experimental setup, parametrization, treatment variations, filtering rule and instructions, see the accompanying document.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization by computer for each individual in each session.
Randomization unit
Individual.
Clusters
250 individuals.
Observations
250 individuals. These refer to individuals for which critical discount factors, and, thus, our outcome variables, can be computed. See the Section "Filtering Rule" in the accompanying document for more details.
Arms
About 83 individuals per treatment. Exact numbers depend on the realized random draws by the computer.
Primary outcomes
Differences in the critical discount factors between the Base game and the HighGain game, and between the Base game and the HighLoss game. (-1,1)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords