Can Generosity Save Cooperation? Evidence from a Cross-Cultural Public Goods Game
How to cite
Gallenstein, Richard; Dougherty, John Paul. 2024. "Can Generosity Save Cooperation? Evidence from a Cross-Cultural Public Goods Game." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012713. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12713-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We conduct a series of dynamic public goods games in two locations, Ghana and the United States, to measure how unconditional cooperation (i.e. generosity) may crowd in cooperation. The key experimental intervention is that in half of the treatments, one participant in the four-player groups, employs an unconditional cooperation strategy, giving all of their endowment to the public good regardless of the behavior of their group members. By experimentally imposing this unconditional cooperation strategy, we are able to determine if such cooperative behavior crowds in cooperation from other group members. An additional treatment introduces inequality of initial endowments to explore whether the impact of unconditional cooperation differs under inequality.
Intervention
We play a public goods game with three experimental variations. (1) We have treatments with and without initial endowment inequality (within-person variation), (2) we have treatments with and without inclusion of an unconditional cooperator (within-person variation), (3) participants will be randomly assigned to one of three categories where two categories with receive pro-social priming in a survey before the first treatment begins.
Experimental design
We will play a public goods game with 4 person groups. In each treatment, the PGG will be repeated 15 times. There will be 4 treatments. In Treatment 1, each participant starts with an equal initial endowment (40 Ghana Cedis for the Ghana sample, $20 for the US sample). In Treatment 2, there is equality of initial endowments but one group member will use an unconditional cooperation strategy, i.e. contributing the entirety of their initial endowment each round. Treatment 3 has inequality of initial endowments. Treatment 4 has inequality of initial endowments and one group member is an unconditional cooperator.
Design details
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