Pay Transparency, Negotiation, and Employer Demand

How to cite

Kim, Taeho; Chotiputsilp, Brighton; Effenterre, Clémentine Van. 2024. "Pay Transparency, Negotiation, and Employer Demand." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012700. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12700-1.0

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Taeho Kim* , Brighton Chotiputsilp , Clémentine Van Effenterre

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012700
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12700-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-05-08 – 2025-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12700

Abstract

Pay transparency policies have become increasingly prevalent in recent years, holding the potential to foster a more equitable and inclusive labor market. However, our understanding of the mechanisms through which these policies operate, particularly in the context of negotiation dynamics between candidates and employers, remains limited due to a lack of real-world data on negotiation processes (Cullen, 2023). In this project, we aim to fill this important gap in the literature by directly studying employer demand and their decision-making regarding candidates who negotiate, and how this dynamic changes under the influence of pay transparency laws. Pay transparency laws can limit firms' flexibility in negotiating salaries with candidates. When the salary range is made public, firms may exhibit a reduced willingness to negotiate due to anticipated broader re-negotiations, concerns regarding fairness, or recognition of candidates strategically navigating the job market armed with more information. Conversely, employers may explore alternative methods to compensate candidates, such as offering non-salary benefits or promoting them to higher positions with higher salary ranges. We will also investigate these firm responses based on the gender of candidates, as negotiation behaviors can be perceived as signals of candidate attributes, which may vary by gender.
Our project aims to address this gap in knowledge by investigating the following questions:
Without pay transparency, how do employers' compensation decisions vary based on the gender of candidates during negotiations?
What impact does pay transparency have on employers' compensation decisions during salary negotiations?
How does the effect of pay transparency on employers' compensation decisions vary by the gender of the candidate?

Intervention

We propose a field experiment conducted in a real-world labor market setting to investigate employers' perceptions of negotiating candidates during the hiring stage, and how that changes when there is pay transparency.

Experimental design

We will conduct a field experiment in real-world labor market settings. We will assume the role of an employer and hire actual recruiters to screen job applications, which have varying intensity of negotiation and whether the salary range was posted.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Recruiter
Clusters
400 recruiters.
Observations
6400 resumes
Arms
200 recruiters under pay transparency regime and 200 recruiters under no pay transparency. Within each regime, half show greater negotiation intent.
Primary outcomes
Our primary outcomes include recruiters’ salary offers, offers of non-salary benefits, and recommendation of continued negotiation.
Secondary outcomes
Current salary prediction, best annual outside offer, suggestions of other non wage benefits such as work-from home, suggestion for a more senior position, recommendation for continued negotiation, perceived likelihood of acceptance of the offer, general comments about the candidate, quality of the overall pool of candidates and general opinion about salary asks, in particular when made outside the pay range.

Cited by

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Keywords