Demand for Income Risk Mitigation
How to cite
Ytsma, Erina; Parker, Geoffrey. 2023. "Demand for Income Risk Mitigation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012678. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12678-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Independent contract work (including gig work) has increased in the 2000s (e.g. Collins et al. (2019); Katz and Krueger (2019a, 2019b); Abraham et al. (2020)). Such work may enable people to self-insure against income or expenditure shocks, but short-term contracts or gigs are also risky. For instance, there is uncertainty whether a suitable job is available when needed, and risks of (last-minute) job cancellations or hours being cut. Moreover, independent contractors are often excluded from unemployment insurance (UI), (employer-provided) health insurance and retirement programs, as well as occupational health and safety regulations, wage and hour laws. Thus, as regular employment contracts decrease, firms are insuring agents against risk less. This begs the question whether there is demand for (supplemental) risk mitigation, specifically of income risk.
To answer this question we employ an RCT on a nationwide online labor market platform to estimate the demand for insurance against various types of income risk. Workers using the platform will be presented with a series of discrete choices between a job contract that offers less insurance and one that offers more insurance against a specific type of income risk. Workers are randomized into different insurance groups, each of which is presented with a different insurance option against a specific income risk. Workers are also randomized into different information treatment groups and different alternative insurance options groups. Worker choices will allow us to estimate the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) and willingness to pay (MRS) for income risk mitigation, across risk types, insurance levels and pay levels, the sensitivity of the MRS and WTP to changes in beliefs, and workers’ willingness to trade-off flexibility for insurance.
Experimental design
Workers are recruited through the platform's app, with a notification. The notification contains a link to an external survey, in which respondents are asked to make a series of binary choices between a job contract that offers more and less insurance. The premium and pay-out for the contract that offers more insurance varies between binary choices. The survey is ex ante incentive compatible because the platform is considering introducing one or more of the proposed insurance offerings, and workers' choices may be implemented.
Respondents are randomized into 6 insurance groups, which differ in the kind of income risk they insure, the level of insurance and/or the pay level. Respondents are also randomized into three information treatment groups: a group that receives information about income risk; a group that receives information about last-minute job finding probabilities on the platform; and a group that receives no information. Respondents are asked about their beliefs about the probability that they would experience a negative income shock, as well as their beliefs about the probability that they would be able to find a job at short notice. These beliefs, as well as the aforementioned insurance preference binary choices, are elicited both before and after the information treatment.
Respondents are also asked for their preferences for an income insurance contract, relative to a flexible replacement job option and an inflexible replacement job option. For this elicitation, respondents are assigned to four flexibility-security groups (2 x 2), that differ in the insurance premium for the insurance contract (high or low) and the time frame for the flexible replacement job option (short or long).
Respondents are cross-randomized across all randomizations (insurance group, info treatment, flexibility-security group). We employ stratified randomization, with eligible workers split into 16 mutually exclusive strata based on their sign-up date and experience on the platform, as well as the size of the market in which they are located.
Design details
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