Evaluating alternative targeting of social assistance in fragile settings

How to cite

Abay, Kibrom; Berhane, Guush; Gilligan, Daniel; Tafere, Kibrom; Taffesse, Alemayehu. 2023. "Evaluating alternative targeting of social assistance in fragile settings." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012677. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12677-1.2

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Kibrom Abay* , Guush Berhane , Daniel Gilligan , Kibrom Tafere , Alemayehu Taffesse

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012677
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12677-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2023-11-10 – 2024-12-31
Countries
Ethiopia ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12677

Abstract

This research project aims to address three research objectives. First, we aim to evaluate the performance of alternative targeting approaches including Proxy Means test (PMT), Community-Based Targeting (CBT) and Peer Targeting (PT) in fragile and conflict settings. We measure their relative performance in terms of identifying the poor. Second, we test the performance of alternative variants of community-based targeting approaches under different selection conditionalities and budget constraints. We evaluate the impact of alternative designs to CBT on the breadth and depth of social assistance transfers distributed to members of the community. Third, we evaluate decision-making and negotiation processes in CBT when real incentives are involved and in the absence of actual cash transfers.

Intervention

The interventions in this study occur on two levels: the community leaders and the community members. We describe each of these as follows.
Intervention 1: Ranking of households and allocation of hypothetical and actual cash transfers by community leaders
We ask community leaders to rank households in their respective EAs from the most to the least needy based on their needs assessment for social assistance. We provide community leaders with a lump-sum of cash transfers that they will allocate among their ranked households based on community level random assignment into different budget categories and discretion levels built into the experimental design (see Experimental Design section). We exogenously vary the nature of the transfer (hypothetical versus real), the amount of money available for transfers, and the level of discretion granted to community leaders. This would allow us to study, for example, whether discretion in the selection of beneficiaries and allocation of funds makes community-based targeting more Rawlsian - maximizing the welfare and wellbeing of the worse-off households (Rawls, 1999; 2001) or Utilitarian and hence-maximize the sum of the individuals’ utilities within the community regardless of differences in individual wellbeing (Arrow, 1973; Yaari, 1981; Mill, 1993).

Intervention 2: Peer- and self-ranking of households
Similar to the community-based ranking, we ask all survey households in each EA (approximately 20) to rank themselves and other fellow households in our sample in the same EA from the most to the least needy. Respondents provide these ranks with a view of targeting for social assistance. We build on the 2019 survey, which contained rich information on pre-conflict status of households including consumption, assets and other important modules that allow us to estimate alternative targeting measures including PMT.
These two interventions allow us to compare the rankings from community leaders and peers against the constructed consumption-, poverty-, asset-and a parametrized PMT-based targeting using pre- and post-conflict data.

Experimental design

In this section, we outline the experimental design of the intervention at the community leaders’ level. As discussed above, community leaders of the 180 communities are the key actors in this intervention. The intervention follows community level clustered randomization in which the 180 communities are randomly assigned into one of four groups/ treatment arms. The treatment assignment is based on (i) whether communities receive actual transfer or hypothetical (control), (ii) the nature of discretion given to community leaders when allocating transfers (full discretion versus rule-based) and (iii) the size of the transfer pool available to community leaders to distributed among households within the community (constrained budget involving 10,000 Birr versus relaxed budget of 20,000 Birr). The treatment arms generated by combinations of these treatments are outlined below:

(1) Control: Rule-based targeting using hypothetical transfer of 20,000 Birr (C): This group serves as a control cluster where community leaders are not given any actual funds but are instructed to act as if they have a hypothetical budget of 20,000 Birr to distribute among households in their community. Community leaders are first asked to rank households based on their need for social assistance. They are then asked to allocate this notional budget among the 20 households included in our sample. During this ranking process, leaders are required to strictly adhere to pre-defined rules provided by the research team. These rules are carefully selected to mimic the targeting criteria used in actual social assistance programs in Ethiopia. More specifically, community leaders are asked to prioritize those households who: (i) had difficulty satisfying their food needs; (ii) own no or little asset (e.g., livestock, land); (iii) have limited income-generating activities or capacity; (iv) have lost productive assets due to shocks (e.g., conflict, drought); and (v) have lost family members recently.
(2) Rule-based incentivized targeting with relaxed budget (T1): Another group of communities are randomly assigned to a cluster that receives real transfer funds with a budget of 20,000 Birr (about 360 USD). In this cluster (i) Community leaders are required to rank households based on five pre-determined targeting criteria and allocate the transfers. These criteria are similar to those in the control group and mimic the targeting criteria used by the national safety net program in Ethiopia, the PSNP (e.g., Gilligan et al., 2009; Hoddinott et al., 2012; Abay et al., 2022).
(3) Rule-based incentivized targeting with constrained budget (T3): This group of communities follows similar rules as those in control group, but they receive a constrained budget of 10,000 Birr (about 180 USD). Community leaders are required to rank households based on the five criteria outlined above and allocate the 10, 000 Birr to the community members in our sample. These criteria are designed to mimic the targeting criteria used by the national safety net program in Ethiopia, the PSNP. This treatment arm serves to test the implication of budget constraint.
(4) Incentivized-discretionary targeting (T4): The fourth group of communities are provided a budget of 20,000 Birr to distribute as social assistance to households identified as in need. Here, community leaders rank households based on their own criteria they collectively agree upon. The establishment of these ranking criteria is entirely left to the discretion of the community leaders. It is up to the leaders to determine who among the ranked households gets how much of the 20,000 Birr transfer assigned to the community.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization is done at the village (EA) level using the baseline list of villages. The initial selection of villages into our sample considers their accessibility for a survey. The selected and accessible villages are then randomly assigned into four groups. A reserve list has been prepared in case some of the villages become inaccessible due to conflict.
Randomization unit
Village or community level.
Clusters
180 clusters
Observations
180 communities and about 3,000 households
Arms
T1 (Control): 53 villages T2 (Rule-based, 20, 000 ETB): 41 villages T3 (Rule-based, 10, 000 ETB): 42 villages T4 (Discretionary, 20, 000 ETB): 44 villages
Primary outcomes
Primary outcomes 1. Households’ access to CBT transfers (whether the household receives a transfer or not) 2. Amount of transfer received by households. 3. Amount of transfer devoted to running costs or administrative costs by community leaders 4. Distribution of transfers or inequality in the distribution of transfers
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes 1. The distribution of transfers across beneficiaries 2. The number of beneficiaries in each village 3. Average transfer received by households

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Keywords