Information Interventions and Climate Adaptation

How to cite

Muñoz, Ricardo Pommer. 2024. "Information Interventions and Climate Adaptation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012659. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12659-1.0

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Ricardo Pommer Muñoz*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012659
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12659-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2023-11-10 – 2024-09-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12659

Abstract

This project investigates how information interventions affect decision-making in risky contexts: are recipients becoming more deliberate decision-makers or are they being pushed to a particular option? To what extent can missing insurance markets be explained by pessimism versus lack of knowledge? I implement two interventions on the demand for climate-based index insurance and its welfare implications when facing heterogeneity in expected benefit, risk exposure, and preferences. Crucially, participants make repeated insurance decisions for products with varying contract terms but with a fixed cost. This means some products are free money, while others will never pay. I hypothesize two possible channels through which information interventions affect demand: deliberative competence and push effects. The former predicts demand becomes more responsive to changes in expected benefit for each product, approximating the full-information benchmark. The latter can result in increased demand for all products, regardless of characteristics.

Intervention

Deliberative Competence intervention: Participants receive, printed at endline, historic rainfall data at their own location and insurance target locations, and consensus aggregate coffee yield performance. They also receive an individual rain gauge, with incentives to report local daily rainfall via an automated WhatsApp messaging system, daily rainfall updates of all targets, and estimates of total monthly rain if the average were to hold.

Push Intervention: Participants receive, via WhatsApp, brief videos on a daily basis. The content of these is informative about climate change or index crop insurance, but crucially contains no details on the relative likelihood of rainfall totals. Similarly, they are incentivized to provide their reactions to each video, rating its informativeness, the content, and trustworthiness of the source. These videos are also repeated at endline.

Experimental design

Randomized controlled trial. Participants perform baseline elicitation at a lab-in the-field setting, followed by a remote intervention via WhatsApp, before an endline elicitation. Treatment arms are Control, Deliberative Competence Learning, and Push.

Design details

Randomization method
Stratified randomization done on a computer.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
600
Observations
600
Arms
200
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome of interest is index insurance demand conditional on contract terms. This is elicited through a binary choice between $20.000 COP close to harvest or $500.000 COP conditional on rainfall, measured in location x, exceeds a given threshold y. Locations vary between Tecnicafé (our local implementing partner), Bogotá Airport, and Santiago, Chile (where we have access to live weather station data). The data generated are thus 45 binary buy/no-buy choices, for different contract terms, for each participant. These are elicited at baseline and endline. • Rainfall thresholds are drawn randomly from a skewed triangular distribution, ranging from 0 to 313 mm. • Locations are randomly drawn from all orders that ensure no repeated locations. Sufficient variation in rainfall payment thresholds y, results in some products never paying, while others will practically always pay. Conditional demand means we estimate responsiveness to product characteristics, both at the participant level and in the aggregate. We also estimate the contract characteristics at which demand probability is 50%, or their indifference point. • These response curves are to be estimated, with and without participant fixed effects, and with uniform vs. non-uniform noise assumptions, and normal and extreme-valued noise distributions. Each of these methods jointly identifies indifference points (preferences) and responsiveness: Every four questions participants also reflect on their last binary choice, by answering their level of cognitive uncertainty, as well as their subjective probability of the insurance product paying out next year. We can thus also directly compare self-reported levels of perceived precision. We also elicit willingness to pay for a subset of the shown insurance products in the binary choice module. This is elicited via a Becker-Degroot-Marshak mechanism, with participants answering their willingness to pay for a random subset of 18 products already presented as binary options. We estimate welfare first by comparing the proportion of unfavorable products purchased/unfavorable products not purchased, for a range of risk-aversion parameters. We also estimate risk-aversion directly via a real effort incentivized task, in which Main treatment effects are sensitivity to product characteristics, as measured in the slope of the response curve and indifference points, with heterogeneity analysis based on education level and experienced climate. Changes in self-reported cognitive uncertainty is also a main treatment effect, as it shows participants’ self-awareness of the degree of choice uncertainty. Pre and post measurements are used to increase statistical power in our estimates.
Secondary outcomes
Reaction times are tracked for each decision. We also track compliance with the intervention, in number of rainfall reports/advertising messages sent, as well as spot checks of rain gauge correct installation, and content feedback of advertising videos. Experienced climate is tracked with CHIRPS satellite data for those who do not. We also elicit self-reported risk aversion measures, following Falk et al. 2023, and a novel real effort task for state-dependent risk aversion. This is done via a willingness to accept wages for a task which depends on the realization of their farming income.

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Keywords