Understanding the Consequences of Economic Empowerment in Developing Countries

How to cite

Vecci, Joe; Cullen, Claire; Joshi, Sarthak; Talbot-Jones, Julia. 2023. "Understanding the Consequences of Economic Empowerment in Developing Countries." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012640. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12640-1.2

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Joe Vecci* , Claire Cullen , Sarthak Joshi , Julia Talbot-Jones

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012640
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12640-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2023-12-03 – 2024-01-10
Countries
India ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12640

Abstract

Over recent decades, governments have spent significant resources in efforts to address gender inequality and to empower women. Although the benefits of these policies are well documented, less attention has been given to the unintended consequences that can occur when policies seek to improve outcomes for women. Recent evidence suggests that empowering women can lead to significant backlash in the form of increased discrimination and intimate partner violence. Despite this, there is little empirical research investigating the causes of backlash. Drawing on the existing literature on backlash, we aim to fill this gap by conducting novel experiments to causally test theoretical explanations for backlash.

Intervention

We conduct multiple lab in the field experiments to investigate the possible underlying mechanisms of backlash.

Experimental design

Our design aims to test and measure multiple possible behavioural explanations for the existence of gender-based backlash.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomisation will take place via computer.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomisation is the individual. That is within each village, we will conduct all experiments and treatments. Within each area the experiment they receive and whether it’s a control or treatment will be randomly assigned.
Clusters
There are two forms of treatment allocation. Subjects will be randomly allocated to one of three experiments (excluding social image), within that experiment they will then be again randomly allocated to a treatment or control. This is all done at the level of the individual.
Observations
In total we will collect data from 960 households in 40 villages, which equates to 24 households within each village. This will comprise 960 males and 960 females. As the experiment focuses on the decision of the male household member we focus on the 960 observations of the male here. Althought, if possible, we will try and collect slightly more than 960 around 1000.
Arms
In total we have 4 experiments. Everyone will be allocated to one of three- social norms, status and instrumental. All those assigned to social norms will also take part in the social image experiment. Within each experiment we have a treatment and control which means we have 6 variations. The status and instrumental experiments will each contain 240 observations. This will comprise 120 in the control and 120 in the treatment. In the social norms and social image experiments, we will collect 480 observations. Further, in the social image experiment DMs will be randomly assigned a partner who is male (120) or female (120) in both the control and treatment. In all other cases DMs are assigned to a female partner only. In the social image experiment, we will match DMs with a partner taken from a small sample of respondents who undertook the social norms experiment with either a male partner or were a female DM with a male partner. As this is a small sample we do not study it. Within each village, we will collect 3 observations for the status and instrumental experiment for each experimental treatment/control variation. This will be doubled for the social norms and social image experiment. (Social norms/social image: 12 obs per village, 6 T and 6 C; Instrumental: 6 obs, 3 T and 3 C and Status: 6 obs, 3 T and 3 C).
Primary outcomes
We have two primary outcomes: 1. Willingness to backlash: For experiment 1,3 and 4 we create a variable indicating whether the individual is willing to pay to reduce their partner’s income. This will be constructed as an indicator variable (0/1) where 1= if the DM took the action (i.e., paid to reduce their partners income). 2. Willingness to hide: For experiment 2 we create a variable indicating whether the individual is willing to pay to hide whether the household participated in an empowerment program. This will be constructed as an indicator variable (0/1) where 1= if the DM took the action.
Secondary outcomes
Our secondary outcomes include the following: 1. Labelling of policy - difference on respondent’s supportiveness depending on whether a hypothetical program is labelled as about ‘empowerment’ as about a more neutral ‘families and communities’ 2. Respondent’s decision to sign petition. Specifically, at the end of the survey, respondents will be offered the chance to sign a letter showing their support for women’s rights and gender equality. We also experimentally vary a prime before the petition. Some respondents are randomly assigned a role model prime, where they are reminded of a famous persons support for gender quality. A random subset are not shown this prime prior to being explained the petition. 3. Non Incentivized willingness to pay - e.g. survey questions about how much, hypothetically, the respondent would be willing to pay for the relevant behaviour, such as overruling a female given leadership. We consider this a robustness test. In addition, we will conduct analyses, assessing the relationship between the backlash behaviours identified above (the primary outcome), and a. Partner characteristic information: This is a set of dummies depending on the information given to DMs about their partner. We randomise three different characteristics. This will tell us if different norms impact backlash. This is restricted to the social norms experiment. b. Gender attitudes index - weighted summary index of the gender attitudes asked in the survey. We will create an index for the husband and a separate index for the wife. c. Norms about appropriate behaviour in the game. d. IPV attitudes index - weighted summary index of the IPV attitudes asked in the survey. We will create an index for the husband and a separate index for the wife. e. Relationship quality index- weighted summary index of the relationship quality questions asked in the survey. This is only reported by women. f. Controlling behaviours index - weighted summary index of the Controlling behaviours women report g. Women’s experience of IPV a. Ever experienced (each of emotional, physical, or sexual IPV) b. Frequency of experiencing (each of emotional, physical, or sexual IPV) in past 12 months c. Injuries h. Men’s likelihood of becoming violent - weighted summary index i. Decision-making index- weighted summary index of women’s input in decisions in the household, including across domains a. How much input does woman have b. Who makes final decision i. Decision-making aspirations index- weighted summary index of women’s input in decisions in the household, including across domains - Women’s aspiration for greater decision-making. We also measure a number of robustness checks such as measuring experimenter demand effects, discussion with other survey participants, and social desirability bias. This will be reported in a robustness section.

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Keywords