Onset of Offsets: The Role of Social Signaling in Mitigating Climate Change
How to cite
Pallottini, Ashton. 2023. "Onset of Offsets: The Role of Social Signaling in Mitigating Climate Change." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012632. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12632-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Despite being a top concern for global welfare, policymakers have struggled to implement taxes to address climate change. This has led to an increasing reliance on voluntary actions taken by firms and consumers to combat carbon emissions. In this paper, I experimentally test a non-standard policy that publicizes voluntary consumer carbon mitigation, leveraging social rewards to increase uptake. Specifically, I show that posting names of carbon offset purchasers online is an effective tool to encourage voluntary carbon mitigation, as confirmed by experimentally estimated demand curves. Further, I show that social rewards vary heavily by perceived market penetration of offsets. Uptake increases vastly among those with the lowest perceptions of carbon offset market penetration but is only slightly impacted among those with moderate perceptions. I then estimate a structural model of demand for prosocial actions in the face of social rewards to understand the implications of my findings on optimal subsidy policy. To avoid crowding out social incentives, I show that optimal subsidies for consumer carbon mitigation technologies should start out small at low participation rates and ramp up as these technologies become more common.
Intervention
There are two elements of randomization. The first is whether or not decisions to buy the carbon offsets are public. In the public group, those who buy carbon offsets will be allowed to provide their name to be posted online on a website of our design. This website is promoted on an Instagram page with thousands of followers, as participants are informed. The group who is not public will not have any of these options, they will just decide whether to purchase or not under status quo conditions.
The additional layer of randomization involves altering consumer beliefs about the market penetration of carbon offsets. To do this, each participant is sent a signal which varies perceptions about market penetrations before any decisions about buying offsets are made. This creates exogenous variation in beliefs which we leverage to determine how social rewards vary by these beliefs of market penetration.
Experimental design
This is a survey experiment. Participants are recruited online and provide us with demographic information. We then inform them about carbon offsets, in case they are unfamiliar. From here, first- and second-order beliefs on market share of carbon offsets are elicited in an incentivized manner. We provide participants with random signals that shift second-order beliefs and serve as an instrument. Finally, we give participants the choice between receiving a bonus payment or buying an offset, where some participants are told their action will yield their name being posted online while others are not. From here, we ask several questions to determine which mechanisms drive the impact of name-posting as well as to determine endline beliefs about carbon offsets and the survey more specifically.
Design details
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