Supervisor Predictions and Intertemporal Effort

How to cite

Chaudhry, Zain; Hussain, Karrar; Callen, Michael. 2023. "Supervisor Predictions and Intertemporal Effort." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012584. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12584-1.0

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Zain Chaudhry* , Karrar Hussain , Michael Callen

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012584
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12584-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-03-01 – 2024-08-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12584

Abstract

What is the right level of decentralization? In a standard principal-agent model, principal(s) may delegate decision-making authority to agents to take advantage of the agents' superior information, which is offset as the principal(s) lose(s) complete control and the agent can pursue their own objectives (to a certain extent). However, this information advantage is typically for certain easily observable elements. Does this information advantage hold for elements such as intertemporal effort allocation which has harder characteristics associated with it such as present bias and the level of sophistication on part of the agent. For the latter, a large literature has establishment the existence of naivete on part of agents themselves. Our idea is that an agent might herself be unaware of her own present-bias and thus an external actor, a principal, may be able to better ascertain this about her and thus make better choices.

Further, if an agent does still possess superior information, the question for the public sector, which has multiple decision-making layers, and multiple principals is: what advantage do agents have over different levels of authority? Are principals closer to the agent better informed and how can their involvement improve performance? We conduct a field experiment to understand the informational advantage of community health workers, their immediate supervisors and senior-most Department of Health officials. However, this question is not just relevant for the public sector, but in any organization including private sector organizations, where different levels of authority exist.

Experimental design

\textbf{Elicitation for Structural Estimation:} On Day 0, we call in the CHWs to collect demographic data and elicit preferences after carefully explaining the experimental protocols. The CHWs divided $m$={15...57} tasks (household health surveys) between two dates that were one week apart, Day 7 (allocation $v_1$) and Day 14 (allocation $v_2$). The CHWs make these decisions at multiple task rates, essentially interest rates between the present and future, which were experimentally varied: $R$ = {0.4, 0.5...1.7, 1.8}. For each task allocated to Day 14, the number of tasks allocated to Day 7 was reduced by $R$. These were advance choices --- made one week before the task was to be attempted. On Day 7, all CHWs make the same choices again, but for that very day (before they had to complete the tasks for that day) and the next week. These were the immediate choices --- made on the same day the task had to be attempted. As multiple choices were made, in advance and immediately, and at multiple task rates, we chose one choice probabilistically for each CHW to implement. This is the decision-that-counts and was implemented on Day 7 and then again on Day 14. %This design was based on \cite{andreoni2012estimating}.\footnote{It has been used by and Chaudhry and Hussain (2022).} %In Figure \ref{decisionset}, we show one example of the decision sets we used to elicit these preferences. This exercise took place in September 2022.

To avoid corner solutions at 0 or $m$ households in allocation decisions, we set a minimum of 5 and maximum of 27 households in the decision sets we offered. The goal of setting a minimum was to ensure that CHWs worked on both dates and made a choice about how to allocate tasks between them. Further, when CHWs made decisions on Day 7, we did not remind them of the Day 0 allocations. Importantly, on Day 0, CHWs were making decisions involving two future work dates (one and two weeks later), whereas on Day 7, they were making decisions for the same day and the week after. From every CHW we elicit 15 advance and 15 immediate decisions over two weeks, and 1 of their 30 decisions was assigned to them as the decision-that-counts.

The purpose of this exercise was to elicit the effort allocations and structurally estimate every CHW's discount factor $\delta$, present bias $\beta$, and intertemporal effort cost $\gamma$.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer
Randomization unit
Health worker
Clusters
350
Observations
Over 10,000
Arms
Equally divided
Primary outcomes
Allocation of effort; correct prediction of effort at different levels

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords