War and Peace in the Shadow of the Future

How to cite

Jiang, Shuguang; Villeval, Marie Claire; Zhang, Zhengping; Zheng, Jie. 2023. "War and Peace in the Shadow of the Future." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012539. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12539-1.0

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Shuguang Jiang* , Marie Claire Villeval , Zhengping Zhang , Jie Zheng

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012539
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12539-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-11-22 – 2024-03-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C91, D74, H56
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12539

Abstract

The Thucydides Trap theory postulates that a rising power will inevitably challenge the status of an established power, and the established power will also take measures to restrain and suppress the rising power. Conflict between the two is seen as unavoidable. We test weather future economic prospects matter. If future economic prospects are positive, both parties are more likely to engage in cooperation, whereas if prospects are negative, conflicts are more likely to arise. We use a lab experiment to test cooperation and conflict between a rising power and an established power and how future economic prospects (a growing versus a declining total pie) affect the occurrence of conflict. We further explore possible measures to avoid conflict in this background.

Intervention

The experiment consists of three main conditions (treatments):
a) The control treatment in which the total resource is kept fixed in each period;
b) The growth treatment in which the total resources grow by a fixed amount after each period;
c) Tthe decline treatment in which the total resources decrease by a fixed amount after each period.

Experimental design

We employ a dynamic bargaining game in which two players decide to allocate a pie among themselves. The relative strenghs of the two players change over time. We use this game to capture the nature of the Thucydides Trap that a rising power competes with a established power. We will vary how the amount of the pie changes over time in different treatments to capture the role of future economic prospects on behavior and the conflict rate: in a control treatment in which the pie is kept fixed over time; in a growth treatment the pie grows by a fixed percentage across period; and in a decline treatment the pie decreases by a fixed percentage over time.

Design details

Randomization method
We randomly assign subjects into different treatments.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
150 pairs
Observations
300 subjects
Arms
100 subjects for each treatment
Primary outcomes
Our study primarily aims to examine whether there are differences in the challenging rate across treatments.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords