Perceived Economic Performance of Nondemocracies and Support for Democracy: Responses to Information from Different Sources.

How to cite

Zavaleta, Gastón García; Ajzenman, Nicolás; Fiszbein, Martín; Cruces, Guillermo; Molina, Carlos; Acemoglu, Daron. 2023. "Perceived Economic Performance of Nondemocracies and Support for Democracy: Responses to Information from Different Sources.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012523. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12523-1.0

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Gastón García Zavaleta* , Nicolás Ajzenman , Martín Fiszbein , Guillermo Cruces , Carlos Molina , Daron Acemoglu

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012523
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12523-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2023-11-14 – 2023-11-17
Countries
Argentina ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12523

Abstract

In a recent paper, Acemoglu et al. (2023) show that democracies breed their own support, but only when they are successful along key dimensions, including economic growth, provision of public goods, limited inequality. With this background, recent decades present a somewhat puzzling combination of relative economic success with declining support for democracy at a global scale. However, there is no contradiction. One important consideration is that support for democracy is likely influenced by perceptions of economic success, which may or may not be accurate. Democracies today have to deal new patterns of political communication brought about by the spread of social media. Misinformation and echo chambers may break the link between economic success in democracies and support for democracy.

Understanding how information about the economic performance of democracies and autocracies shapes support for democracy is a key challenge for the present day, as the declining support for democracy is plausibly related to episodes of democratic backsliding and rise in right-wing populist movements. Information itself, and the medium through which it is delivered, may both be key for the formation of democratic attitudes. In this study, we propose a survey experiment with different information treatments to test how information on the performance of democracies and autocracies, coming from different sources, affect the beliefs about the economic performance of political regimes and to test how changes in these beliefs affect support for democracy.

Intervention

We propose a survey experiment with different information treatments to test how various information sources affect the beliefs about the economic performance of autocracies and to test how these beliefs affect support for democracy.
Our survey will have six sections:
1. Introduction and consent.
2. Demographic questions. In this section we will also ask “How much time do you spend weekly informing yourself about political issues?” and “Through what media do you find out about political issues?”.
3. Treatment. Eight arms.
4. Questions about preferences for autocracies.
5. Questions about post-treatment beliefs on the economic performance of autocracies.
6. Additional questions.

In section 3, each respondent will be randomly assigned to one of eight groups.
1. Control: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.
2. Media - Positive: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them a newspaper article suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very good.
3. Media - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them a newspaper article suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very bad.
4. Tweet - Positive: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Ad- ditionally, we show them tweets suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very good.
5. Tweet - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Ad- ditionally, we show them tweets suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very bad.
6. Evidence - Positive: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them scientific evidence suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very good.
7. Evidence - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them scientific evidence suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very bad.
8. Opinion - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we tell them that, in our opinion, the performance of the Chilean economy during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet was very bad.

In all treatment arms (and in the control group as well) respondents will watch a video that describes autocracies, but instead of directly talking about autocracies the video uses the term “authoritarian governments”.

We will elicit beliefs about the economic performance of autocracies (pre and post-treatment), about attitudes towards democratic governments and, finally, about voting preferences for the incoming election in Argentina. We will also measure the willingness to receive additional information about political regimes and their economic performance and the willingness to receive information about the current state of the Argentinian economy.

Experimental design

Our survey will have six sections:
1. Introduction and consent.
2. Demographic questions. In this section we will also ask “How much time do you spend weekly informing yourself about political issues?” and “Through what media do you find out about political issues?”.
3. Treatment. Eight arms.
4. Questions about preferences for autocracies.
5. Questions about post-treatment beliefs on the economic performance of autocracies.
6. Additional questions.

In section 3, each respondent will be randomly assigned to one of eight groups. Assignment to treatment is stratified by age group and geographical zone.
1. Control: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.
2. Media - Positive: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them a newspaper article suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very good.
3. Media - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them a newspaper article suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very bad.
4. Tweet - Positive: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Ad- ditionally, we show them tweets suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very good.
5. Tweet - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Ad- ditionally, we show them tweets suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very bad.
6. Evidence - Positive: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them scientific evidence suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very good.
7. Evidence - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them scientific evidence suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very bad.
8. Opinion - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we tell them that, in our opinion, the performance of the Chilean economy during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet was very bad.

In all treatment arms (and in the control group as well) respondents will watch a video that describes autocracies, but instead of directly talking about autocracies the video uses the term “authoritarian governments”.

Design details

Randomization method
It will be randomized in office by a computer (researches will not have access to this randomization, it will be conducted by a survey firm)
Randomization unit
Individuals (no clustering).
Clusters
We aim at 1000 individuals per arm. However, we expect some attrition and some respondents to fail the attention check.
Observations
We aim at 1000 individuals per arm. However, we expect some attrition and some respondents to fail the attention check.
Arms
We aim at 1000 individuals per arm. However, we expect some attrition and some respondents to fail the attention check.
Primary outcomes
Beliefs about political systems (democracy and autocracy) and about their economic performance. To measure pre-treatment beliefs, we will ask the respondents about the economic performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government under Pinochet. To measure post-treatment beliefs, we will ask the respondents whether the Argentinian economy would have performed better under a dictatorship during the past 40 years. Preferences for different political regimes: we will mention different characteristics typically associated with democracies and autocracies and ask if the individual agrees (from 1 to 5) with different statements related to how desirable/non desirable those characteristics are in a political system. We will explore heterogeneous treatment effects according to pre-treatment beliefs on the economic performance of autocracies.
Secondary outcomes
Knowledge about autocracies: we will ask specific characteristics that we mentioned in the video to test if individuals recall what they saw. Demand for information: we will ask at the end of the survey if they would like to know more about autocratic regimes and about and about what characteristics a government should have to promote the proper functioning of the economy. Additionally, we will ask if they would like to receive information about the current state of the Argentinian economy. Finally, we will ask at the end of the survey who they are planning to vote in the upcoming presidential elections. We will explore heterogeneous treatment effects according to three dimensions: 1) level of education, 2) time spent informing about political issues, and 3) sources of information used to inform about political issues.

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