Relational Frictions Along the Supply Chain: Evidence from Social Commerce Among Senegalese Traders
How to cite
Houeix, Deivy; Wiles, Edward. 2023. "Relational Frictions Along the Supply Chain: Evidence from Social Commerce Among Senegalese Traders." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012522. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12522-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
With the rise of smartphone ownership, social media, and mobile money, there has been a surge in 'social commerce’. This growing phenomenon is especially pertinent for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) seeking foreign market access, historically hindered by search and trust frictions. We study on how these recent digital advancements might reduce frictions in searching and contracting along international supply chains.
Intervention
We will connect Senegalese importers to intermediaries in Turkey who interact with manufacturers, and we will use social media to vary the information environment to capture key frictions. Our experiment is grounded in theory, allowing us to precisely map the treatments to the different frictions identified.
Experimental design
Our sample will comprise ~1500 Senegalese wholesalers and medium-sized retailers in Dakar within markets (“buyers”), and ~30 intermediaries that live in Turkey or visit regularly (“suppliers”). We choose Turkey as our origin country because it represents a large minority of apparel imports to Senegal and is generally viewed as higher quality than China, though we are open to switching origin country if we find a good reason. We will focus on apparel because (1) it is large, (2) concerns about quality mean contracting frictions are important, (3) variation in fashions and preferences mean search is important.
Design and Treatments: There will be four treatment arms:
1. Search: At the buyer level, we will randomise access to three supplier WhatsApp groups. These are currently existing private groups run by suppliers where they advertise products and prices using high quality pictures and videos. This reduces two types of search friction: (1) cost of finding a new foreign supplier, (2) cost of seeing varieties and quality offered.
2. Reputation building: The theory predicts that if buyers share information about suppliers’ types, they will trade more and learn faster. Thus, within merchants in supplier groups, we will randomise half of them into small buyer groups without suppliers to share information about suppliers and learn about types through "social feedback". We will design this so that buyers in groups are all matched with the same suppliers.
3. Moral Hazard: The theory predicts that buyers can use joint punishment strategies to incentivize the supplier more strongly than they could on their own (as in Greif, 1993). We will thus inform all suppliers about the existence of buyer groups. We will make clear to the suppliers that we will help buyers coordinate and share feedback to ensure that the seller realizes that a joint punishment equilibrium is realistic. We will inform a random part of the buyers that the suppliers have that motivation to measure the moral hazard impact on buyers.
These three treatments shut down/activate some existing features of WhatsApp, ubiquitously used by merchants for their business, to disentangle mechanisms of the impact of social commerce.
4. E-Commerce training: We will inform and train a random subset of merchants on a traditional e-commerce B2B platforms available in Senegal to test differences between traditional e-commerce and social commerce.
Design details
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