General Training and Reciprocity
How to cite
Lin, Senran; Choo, Lawrence; Zhao, Liangfo. 2023. "General Training and Reciprocity." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012517. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12517-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In this experimental study, we examine the role of worker reciprocity—the tendency to reward kindness and punish unkindness—as a driving factor behind firms' investment in general training that benefits not only themselves but also other firms in the industry. Specifically, the experiment is designed to disentangle the effects of intention-based reciprocity from those of distributional preferences in explaining this behavior. We employ a two-by-two design to investigate workers' responses to both intentional and randomly assigned training levels, assessing the impact of intention-based reciprocity. Simultaneously, the design varies to allow for either positive or negative reciprocation towards the employer through unobservable efforts.
Intervention
We will have 4 treatments in a two-by-two design:
Positive-Exogenous, Negative-Exogenous, Positive-Endogenous, Negative-Endogenous
Endogenous (Exogenous) refers to whether the the training level is determined by Employers (randomized device)
Positive (Negative) refers to whether the worker's unobservable effort benefits (harms) Employer
Experimental design
Our study incorporates several phases, beginning with a practice session for Real Effort Tasks and a characteristic-based questionnaire to match subjects. The core of the experiment involves subjects assuming 'Employer' and 'Worker' roles, where each subject engages in a full strategy method, making decisions both as an Employer and as a Worker before knowing their actual role. In this phase, Employers invest in training at various levels, each associated with a specific cost, and simultaneously propose new wages. Correspondingly, Workers make unobservable efforts that influence Employer profits based on different training levels. They also determine their minimum acceptable wage for each training level, which affects the income of both parties.
Once roles are assigned, Workers proceed to the real-effort tasks phase. The experiment concludes with a post-experiment survey designed to assess participants' social value orientation and their inclination towards positive or negative reciprocity
Design details
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