General Training and Reciprocity

How to cite

Lin, Senran; Choo, Lawrence; Zhao, Liangfo. 2023. "General Training and Reciprocity." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012517. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12517-1.0

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Senran Lin* , Lawrence Choo , Liangfo Zhao

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012517
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12517-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-11-18 – 2024-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C72, C92, M53, M54
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12517

Abstract

In this experimental study, we examine the role of worker reciprocity—the tendency to reward kindness and punish unkindness—as a driving factor behind firms' investment in general training that benefits not only themselves but also other firms in the industry. Specifically, the experiment is designed to disentangle the effects of intention-based reciprocity from those of distributional preferences in explaining this behavior. We employ a two-by-two design to investigate workers' responses to both intentional and randomly assigned training levels, assessing the impact of intention-based reciprocity. Simultaneously, the design varies to allow for either positive or negative reciprocation towards the employer through unobservable efforts.

Intervention

We will have 4 treatments in a two-by-two design:
Positive-Exogenous, Negative-Exogenous, Positive-Endogenous, Negative-Endogenous

Endogenous (Exogenous) refers to whether the the training level is determined by Employers (randomized device)
Positive (Negative) refers to whether the worker's unobservable effort benefits (harms) Employer

Experimental design

Our study incorporates several phases, beginning with a practice session for Real Effort Tasks and a characteristic-based questionnaire to match subjects. The core of the experiment involves subjects assuming 'Employer' and 'Worker' roles, where each subject engages in a full strategy method, making decisions both as an Employer and as a Worker before knowing their actual role. In this phase, Employers invest in training at various levels, each associated with a specific cost, and simultaneously propose new wages. Correspondingly, Workers make unobservable efforts that influence Employer profits based on different training levels. They also determine their minimum acceptable wage for each training level, which affects the income of both parties.

Once roles are assigned, Workers proceed to the real-effort tasks phase. The experiment concludes with a post-experiment survey designed to assess participants' social value orientation and their inclination towards positive or negative reciprocity

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization in our experiment is conducted in the lab using a computer. Subjects are randomly assigned to treatments by computer. Within a treatment, the role of each subject (either Employer or Worker) is randomly determined by the computer.
Randomization unit
individuals
Clusters
N/A
Observations
240 observations, corresponding to the 240 university students participating in the study
Arms
Planned Number of Participants: 240 university students, with 60 participants allocated to each of the four treatments
Primary outcomes
We will collect the following data from each treatment: Number of real-effort task completions by Workers. Training level and wage decisions made by Employers. Effort contribution and Minimum-Acceptable-Wage (MAW) decisions from Workers.

Cited by

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Keywords