Multiple Remedies Contracts with Optional Damage and Communication: An Experimental Study

How to cite

Wang, Siyu. 2023. "Multiple Remedies Contracts with Optional Damage and Communication: An Experimental Study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012496. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12496-1.0

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Siyu Wang*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012496
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12496-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2021-10-01 – 2024-04-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
K12; C92; D8
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12496

Abstract

We are examining the superiority of a contract that grants the non-breaching party the option to choose from various remedies compared to an exclusive remedy contract, and exploring the impact of communication on the contract process. Our focus is on conditions of double-sided uncertainty and asymmetric information between a seller (who might breach) and a buyer (who never breaches). Theoretically, if the buyer's conditional expected valuation is greater than the seller's conditional expected valuation, then a contract that allows the buyer to choose between liquidated damages or specific performance (or actual damages) is considered superior. We test the theoretical results in the laboratory. In addition, by introducing communication at the stage when the seller decides whether to deliver the goods, we are investigating whether cheap talk can enhance social welfare or benefit the seller more than the buyer.

Intervention

We are examining the superiority of a contract that grants the non-breaching party the option to choose from various remedies compared to an exclusive remedy contract, and exploring the impact of communication on the contract process. Our focus is on conditions of double-sided uncertainty and asymmetric information between a seller (who might breach) and a buyer (who never breaches). Theoretically, if the buyer's conditional expected valuation is greater than the seller's conditional expected valuation, then a contract that allows the buyer to choose between liquidated damages or specific performance (or actual damages) is considered superior. We test the theoretical results in the laboratory. In addition, by introducing communication at the stage when the seller decides whether to deliver the goods, we are investigating whether cheap talk can enhance social welfare or benefit the seller more than the buyer.

Experimental design

In this experimental procedure, participants are randomly assigned to groups of two, comprising one Seller and one Buyer. The Seller has the capacity to produce a product and offer it for sale to the Buyer. The cost of production is randomly determined between 0 and 600, with each integer having an equal likelihood. Similarly, the value of the product to the Buyer is randomly selected between 0 and 1000, again with equal probabilities for each integer. In the LD, there are three stages: proposing the contract (buyer), accept or reject the contract (seller), deliver the project or not after observing the cost(seller). In the OD, there is an additional 4th stage, where the buyer can decide whether to veto the action of not delivering the project. We add a cheap talk as additional treatments to see how communication between two parties can impact the outcome.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
individual randomly grouped into 2-person pair in every round.
Clusters
N.A.
Observations
150 - 200 subjects.
Arms
50-70 subjects in each treatment
Primary outcomes
Acceptance Rate, Delivery Rate, Veto Rate, Profit, Consumer Surplus

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords