Price Competition and Cooperation on Sustainable Investments

How to cite

Cason, Timothy; Vries, Frans de; Kiso, Takahiko. 2023. "Price Competition and Cooperation on Sustainable Investments." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012490. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12490-1.0

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Timothy Cason* , Frans de Vries , Takahiko Kiso

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012490
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12490-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-11-13 – 2024-05-03
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12490

Abstract

This lab experiment investigates how potential cooperation between firms on sustainable consumption and production (SCP) investments affects subsequent price competition. In an initial stage, duopolists make a binary sustainability investment decision (e.g., corresponding to waste and pollution reduction, energy efficiency technology adoption, etc.) that affects their costs. Investment also shifts demand, as some consumers value sustainability. In later stages firms set prices simultaneously in a sequence of indefinitely repeated rounds. To investigate how cooperation in SCP investment affects price competition, in some treatments the sellers can communicate in the investment stage. The experiment implements communication using free-form chat or more restrictive messages focused on the investment decision in different treatments. It also includes exogenous random variation in investment success. Treatments also vary costs and demand so that either investment or non-investment is a profit-maximizing strategy conditional on noncooperative pricing. The experiment also elicits subjects’ risk tolerance and social value orientation.

Intervention

Communication opportunities will be varied across treatments. This includes a no-communication baseline, and a treatment in which firms in the duopoly pair can exchange rich and free form (chat) messages before each sustainability investment decision. The experiment will also include a communication treatment with a more restrictive (binary) message space. The cost and demand impact of the sustainability investments will also be varied across treatments, which determines the profit and consumer surplus impact of investment.

Experimental design

This is a laboratory experiment, conducted in a standard university experimental economics lab, recruiting students broadly across the university. Subjects will be randomly assigned to a treatment, which is fixed throughout their experimental session. They will be randomly assigned to duopoly pairs to make investment and price choices. All subjects will be sellers, and demand for the differentiated products is computerized.
Each session will include 10 supergames, with random and anonymous re-pairing of sellers between supergames. Each supergame is repeated for an indefinite number of rounds, with a continuation probability of 7/8 each round. The experiment employs block random termination (4-round blocks). Prior to each set of 4 rounds, sellers will decide whether to make an investment decision, which affects their costs and the demand they face for these rounds. Investment only succeeds with 4/5 probability.
The combination of successful investments determines the payoff matrix for the pricing subgame that applies for the subsequent 4 rounds. Sellers chose simultaneously each round from a set of 8 possible prices. They receive feedback at the end of each round regarding the other seller’s investment and price choice, as well as their own earnings for the round. At the end of their session, subjects are paid for all rounds conducted prior to the supergames’ random termination.

Design details

Randomization method
Subjects will be recruited by email using ORSEE. They choose between a list of available sessions, and the session is randomized to a treatment before it is initialized.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
20 independent matching groups, 12 sessions
Observations
320 individuals
Arms
32 individuals in the chat communication X payoff treatments 64 individuals in each of the no communication and binary communication X payoff treatments
Primary outcomes
Investment rates Price choices in different investment subgames Firm Profits Consumer Surplus Total Welfare
Secondary outcomes
Communication content

Cited by

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Keywords