The Value of Rating Systems in Credence Goods Markets
How to cite
Rittmannsberger, Thomas; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Mimra, Wanda; Angerer, Silvia; Waibel, Christian. 2023. "The Value of Rating Systems in Credence Goods Markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012483. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12483-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In this project, we replicate the four main treatments in Angerer et al. (2022) using a neutral frame (instead of a healthcare frame).
We experimentally investigate the effect of public consumer ratings on market outcomes in credence goods markets. Contrary to search or experience goods, consumers cannot evaluate all dimensions of trade for credence goods, which may inhibit the information and reputation-building value of public rating systems. We implement a expert market in which experts have an informational advantage over consumers with respect to the apppropriate treatment. The rating system takes the form of a five-star rating system as is common on online rating websites. The value of this rating system is compared in two different expert market settings: First, one in which consumers cannot rely on information from personal experience with the expert, reflecting markets in which consumer-expert interactions are often first-time and infrequent. Second, one in which consumers have personal experience with the expert, reflecting markets in which consumer-expert interactions are frequent and repeated.
Reference:
Angerer, S., Glätzle-Rützler, D., Mimra, W., Rittmannsberger, T., & Waibel, C. (2022). The value of rating systems in healthcare credence goods markets. Available at SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn. 3965318
Intervention
We replicate the four main treatments in Angerer et al. (2022) with a neutral frame.
We employ a 2x2 factorial design to experimentally investigate the effect of a public rating system in two different expert markets: A market in which consumers can rely on their personal experience, and one in which they cannot. These two different market environments are implemented in the experiment as follows:
In the conditions without personal experience, in each period consumers choose one expert from a list of four without being able to identify them. All players are informed beforehand that consumers have no means of identifying experts from previous periods. Thus, although consumers observe their payoffs in each period and can partially infer expert behavior, they cannot attribute it to a particular expert and therefore cannot build up personal experience with a particular expert. In experimental conditions with personal experience, consumers can identify experts by a fixed ID and decide whether to interact with a particular identified expert. Over the 16 periods of play, they can thus learn from their personal experience (payoffs) with a particular identified expert.
In the conditions with the public rating system, consumers can choose to rate interactions with experts on a five-star rating scale after receiving their payoff in a given period. This rating is shown to the respective expert at the end of the period. Subsequently, ratings for each expert over all treated consumers are aggregated, averaged, and displayed to consumers. Consumers see these public ratings for all experts when they decide whether to interact and which expert to choose starting in period 5. In the condition without personal experience, as highlighted before, consumers cannot identify a particular expert and only see the public ratings. The public ratings of all experts are displayed to experts when they decide on the type of treatment and which price to charge in a given period.
In total, we run four experimental conditions: BASELINE (no experience, no rating), EXPERIENCE (experience, no rating), RATING (no experience, rating), EXP-RATING (experience, rating).
Reference:
Angerer, S., Glätzle-Rützler, D., Mimra, W., Rittmannsberger, T., & Waibel, C. (2022). The value of rating systems in healthcare credence goods markets. Available at SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn. 3965318
Experimental design
We plan to use a student sample from the University of Innsbruck and run each experimental condition with 48 subjects (as suggested by our power analysis). Therefore, we plan to run two sessions with 24 subjects each in every experimental condition. All sessions are run computerized using z-Tree and students are recruited using hroot. Participants do not know which experiment they are going to participate in when they register. They only receive information about the expected duration of the experiment (1:45h).
Our experiment is structured as follows for all our conditions:
Stage 1: The experimenter explains the experiment and participants read the instructions.
Stage 2: Participants answer several control questions to ensure they understood the game.
Stage 3: The computer randomly assigns roles and markets to participants.
Stage 4: Participants play the game for 16 periods.
Stage 5: Participants participate in additional games: an individual risk preference task, a dictator game, a lying task, and a trust game.
Stage 6: Participants fill out a questionnaire.
Design details
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