Effects of Employer-Enabled Performance-Linked Savings on Savings Behavior of Workers and Firm Performance in the Garment Industry
How to cite
Adhvaryu, Achyuta; Nyshadham, Anant; Gade, Smit; Dhanaraj, Sowmya. 2024. "Effects of Employer-Enabled Performance-Linked Savings on Savings Behavior of Workers and Firm Performance in the Garment Industry." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012460. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12460-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Low-income individuals face several challenges in saving formally and regularly which their employers can uniquely help them overcome. Employers can offer access to a formal payroll account, assist with documentation, and arrange for automatic deductions from the salary.
In this study, we propose to conduct a Randomised Control Trial (RCT), wherein we offer a bank-based recurring deposit (RD) to production workers of Shahi Exports, a garment manufacturing firm in Karnataka, India. The RD would serve as a commitment saving instrument for workers, requiring fixed monthly instalments for 6 months. In our study, these instalments would be made from the workers’ salary through automatic payroll deductions facilitated by Shahi, their employer. Further, for some workers savings in their RD would be linked to and rewarded based on their tenure and attendance. With this set-up, the study is aimed at understanding if performance-linked employer-enabled commitment saving plans can simultaneously improve i) formal savings of low-income workers and ii) firm performance.
Intervention
This study is a Randomised Control Trial, wherein we offer a bank-based recurring deposit (RD) to production workers of Shahi Exports, a garment manufacturing firm in Karnataka, India. The RD would serve as a commitment saving instrument for workers, requiring fixed monthly instalments for 6 months. In our study, these instalments would be made from the workers’ salary through automatic payroll deductions facilitated by Shahi, their employer. Further, for some workers savings in their RD would be linked to and rewarded based on their tenure and attendance. With this set-up, the study is aimed at understanding if performance-linked employer-enabled commitment saving plans can simultaneously improve i) formal savings of low-income workers and ii) firm performance.
Along with a control group, the study involves three treatment groups. The first treatment group only receives access to the RD and automatic deductions in it. Second and third treatment groups, in addition to the RD and payroll deductions, also receive rewards linking their savings and performance. Comparing these groups, we evaluate the causal impact of each component of the savings plan on workers’ savings in the plan, their total savings and on workplace outcomes in terms of attendance and tenure.
Experimental design
Control - Business as usual. For these workers, the attendance bonus will be deposited in their payroll account, along with their salary.
Treatment 1 - Workers will be offered to open an RD and a zero-balance savings account linked to it. For these workers, the employer would deposit the amount equivalent to the attendance bonus in the RD linked savings account, while regular salary gets deposited in the payroll account as usual.
Treatment 2 - Workers will be offered the savings plan as described in Treatment 1. In addition, conditional on completing a tenure of 6 months with the employer, and continuing to hold the RD during this time, workers will be offered a top-up interest rate by the employer.
Treatment 3 - Along with all the offered savings plan and top-up interest rate mentioned in Treatment 2, workers will further get an attendance reward, which is proportionate to the total attendance bonus earned in the 6 months of the study.
Design details
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