When norms are broken: the effect of preselecting distribution rules on bargaining outcomes

How to cite

Pham, Vinh; Kamijo, Yoshio; Jiang, Linjia. 2023. "When norms are broken: the effect of preselecting distribution rules on bargaining outcomes." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012394. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12394-1.1

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Vinh Pham* , Yoshio Kamijo , Linjia Jiang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012394
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12394-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2023-11-07 – 2024-02-07
Countries
Japan (Tokyo)
JEL codes
C78, C91, D63
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12394

Abstract

From existing literature, we assume that when participants choose to follow the distribution rules in a bargaining problem, the rules represent their norms and entitlements. At the beginning of the experiment, participants will be asked to select their preferred distribution among three rules: equal division (the two bargainers share the total pie equally), equal surplus (the bargainers share equally the surplus, the difference between the total pie and their disagreement payoffs) and proportional distribution (the bargainers get a part of the pie proportional to their disagreement payoffs). The disagreement payoffs are determined by their performance in a real-effort task. We then have 3 scenarios: (1) when the bargainers choose the same distribution rule and both agree to follow it, subjects will automatically earn according to the rule, (2) when the bargainers choose the same distribution rule but did not agree to follow it, a bargaining stage will proceed, and (3) when the bargainers choose different distribution rules, a bargaining stage will also proceed. Scenario (2) is our next focus, as we will examine when this rule switching occurs. Lastly, during bargaining, we will also analyze proposals and agreement rates. We will investigate these research topics in a Nash demand game and an unstructured bargaining game.

Experimental design

- The experiment will consist of three stages.
- The first stage is to select a preferred distribution rule among three rules.
- The second stage requires subjects to complete a real-effort task (the slider test).
- The third stage is divided into four parts. First, subjects will see the bargaining conditions, containing their results of the real-effort tasks, disagreement payoffs and the pie size. Second, each subject sees the rules chosen by the matched participant. Third, if both subjects in the same pair choose the same rule, they will decide if they want to follow the rule or not. If they choose to follow the rule, the payoff will be automatically determined based on the distribution rule. If they choose not to follow the rule, they will continue to the negotiation part. On the other hand, if both subjects choose different rules, they will continue to the negotiation part directly. Fourth, the paired subjects will bargain with each other based on either a Nash demand game or unstructured bargaining. Depending on the treatment, the bargainers can communicate with each other (via a chatbox) during negotiation.
- The three treatments are: (1) Nash bargaining game without communication, (2) Nash bargaining game with communication, and (3) unstructured bargaining with communication

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization by computer will determine pairing.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
144 individuals
Observations
1152 (8 per subject)
Arms
48 per treatment
Primary outcomes
- Selection rates of the three distribution rules - Conditions that triggers bargaining (when subjects choose the same rules) - Bargaining outcomes
Secondary outcomes
How experience (the round within the experiment) and subjects' risk tolerance affect bargaining behaviors

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Keywords