Designing Subsidy Reforms When Trust is Low: A Survey Experiment from Latin America

How to cite

Kyle, Jordan; Ardanaz, Martin; Scartascini, Carlos. 2024. "Designing Subsidy Reforms When Trust is Low: A Survey Experiment from Latin America." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012384. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12384-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Jordan Kyle* , Martin Ardanaz , Carlos Scartascini

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012384
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12384-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2023-12-08 – 2024-12-31
Countries
Argentina (), Brazil (), Chile (), Colombia (), Costa Rica (), Guatemala (), Mexico (), Panama (), Peru ()
JEL codes
D72, D73, D91, H23, Q38, P11
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12384

Abstract

For decades, economists have given standard advice on advancing Pareto improving economic reforms that have redistributive consequences: implement the reform while using savings to compensate losers from reform, ensuring that all are better off. Fossil fuel subsidies are a quintessential example of a distortionary economic policy prevalent in many developing countries. By pricing fuel below market value and failing to price in externalities, they promote over-consumption of fossil fuels and affect the adoption of clean energy alternatives, not to mention strain government budgets and crowd out forms of public spending that would promote economic growth. Although fuel subsidies are generally regressive—with richer households with higher consumption benefitting more in absolute terms—poor households still benefit from these subsidies, and any reform would affect them. Standard economic advice is thus to repeal the subsidies while compensating poor households for higher fuel prices.

Yet, citizens often have good reason to mistrust promises to compensate them for the costs of reform. If governments have a poor track record of implementing redistributive programming, compensation promises are unlikely to be credible. Similarly, if trust in government is low, citizens may be loathe to entrust governments with any ‘savings’ from lowering public spending on fuel subsidies. Using a survey experiment implemented across nine Latin American countries, we consider which groups may be most receptive to compensation and how different compensation strategies are most effective at reducing opposition to fuel subsidy reform.

Intervention

We have three study arms. All survey participants will receive a brief survey vignette outlining some of the general costs and benefits of eliminating subsidies on fuel, elecricity, and transport. Treatment group 1 (T1) receives an additional portion of the vignette designed to test whether adding a promise of compensating the poor for some of the costs of reform will affect support for reform, and among which groups. Treatment group 2 (T2), on the other hand, tests whether changing the institution responsible for implementing the promised compensation affects support for reform.

Experimental design

This survey experiment will be implemented among 9,000 online respondents in nine Latin American countries (Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama), with 1,000 respondents targeted in each of the 9 countries. These countries span different ideological orientations, average levels of trust in government, and types of subsidy programs. The online survey will be implemented by LAPOP. The sample will be drawn from a standing online panel, which is representative of the online-population in these countries.

The experimental design randomly varied whether individual respondents were exposed to the placebo, T1, or T2 vignette. The vignettes were designed to vary the institutions responsible for implementing a transfer to compensate poor households for the higher prices that come with eliminating subsidies. Following the vignette, we measured an attitudinal outcome for respondents’ level of support for subsidy reform. .

Design details

Randomization method
randomization embedded into survey design, assigning treatment status with 1/3 probability to placebo, T1, or T2
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
9,000 individuals
Observations
9,000
Arms
3,000 individuals per treatment arm (placebo, T1, T2)
Primary outcomes
After each vignette, respondents are asked the extent to which they agree with the reform on a 4-part scale. We plan to both look at the 4-point scale as well as a binary variable indicating whether the respondent broadly “agrees” or “disagrees” with the proposed reform.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords