Bidder Power in a Multi-Unit Auction

How to cite

Orland, Andreas. 2023. "Bidder Power in a Multi-Unit Auction." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012363. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12363-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Andreas Orland*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012363
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12363-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-10-31 – 2024-07-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C7, C9, D44
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12363

Abstract

In a laboratory experiment, we examine bidder behavior in a multi-unit single-price auction. Two units of a good are for sale. Each bidder has a randomly-determined private valuation. We contrast the behavior of one human bidder in an auction with the behavior of two human bidders. Human bidders have a demand for two units each. The presence of computer-simulated bidders with demand for one unit ensures that the total demand is equal across treatments.

Experimental design

We conduct a lab experiment with two treatments.

In treatment B1, one subject with demand for two units of a good participates in an auction. Two units of the good are auctioned. Three computer-simulated bidders (each with demand for one unit of the good) bid their valuation.

In treatment B2, two subjects with demand for two units of a good participate in an auction. Two units of the good are auctioned. One computer-simulated bidder (with demand for one unit of the good) bids its valuation.

In each auction, the highest two bids receive a unit of the good. The price is determined by the highest rejected bid. The bidders of the successful bids pay their private valuation minus the price. All other bids do receive nothing.

Each individual (B1) or each pair of individuals (B2) goes through 20 rounds (auctions). In B2, the matching of pairs is fixed throughout the experiment.

Design details

Randomization method
A random subset of potential subjects in a database will receive an invitation to one or more of the sessions at a time. The randomization is computer-based. The potential subjects do not know the content of the experiment, and they also do not know the treatment for which they sign up at the time they register. Each subject only takes part in one experimental session.
Randomization unit
Randomization is by experimental session. All participants of a session participate either in treatment B1 or treatment B2.
Clusters
40 independent observations per treatment: treatment B1 with 40 individual subjects, treatment B2 with 40 pairs of two subjects.
Observations
120 subjects.
Arms
40 subjects in B1, 80 subjects in B2.
Primary outcomes
Subjects' decisions and market outcomes: - two bids per round and subject (40 per subject; 40 per cluster in treatment B1, 80 per cluster in treatment B2), - one market price per round (20 per cluster).
Secondary outcomes
Questionnaire items: subjects' gender, student of management or economics (1=yes,0=no), student of game theory (1=yes,0=no), high school math grade, individual decision times (in seconds).

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords