Bidder Power in a Multi-Unit Auction
How to cite
Orland, Andreas. 2023. "Bidder Power in a Multi-Unit Auction." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012363. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12363-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment, we examine bidder behavior in a multi-unit single-price auction. Two units of a good are for sale. Each bidder has a randomly-determined private valuation. We contrast the behavior of one human bidder in an auction with the behavior of two human bidders. Human bidders have a demand for two units each. The presence of computer-simulated bidders with demand for one unit ensures that the total demand is equal across treatments.
Experimental design
We conduct a lab experiment with two treatments.
In treatment B1, one subject with demand for two units of a good participates in an auction. Two units of the good are auctioned. Three computer-simulated bidders (each with demand for one unit of the good) bid their valuation.
In treatment B2, two subjects with demand for two units of a good participate in an auction. Two units of the good are auctioned. One computer-simulated bidder (with demand for one unit of the good) bids its valuation.
In each auction, the highest two bids receive a unit of the good. The price is determined by the highest rejected bid. The bidders of the successful bids pay their private valuation minus the price. All other bids do receive nothing.
Each individual (B1) or each pair of individuals (B2) goes through 20 rounds (auctions). In B2, the matching of pairs is fixed throughout the experiment.
Design details
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