Does pay transparency in salary lead to inequality in non-transparent benefits?
How to cite
Pan, Xiaofei. 2023. "Does pay transparency in salary lead to inequality in non-transparent benefits?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012349. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12349-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
There have been increased calls for pay transparency law across the developing world. Literature showed that pay transparency law has been shown to reduce pay inequality while others have found evidence of employees’ increasing idiosyncratic requests for non-transparent benefits. Yet, little is known how employers allocate between salary and the benefit when salary becomes transparent, and benefits remains to be non-transparent. In this paper, I would like to ask that when two workers are randomly assigned with unequal total compensation, and the employers have opportunities to allocate bonus between the two workers, how would the employers allocate the bonus. Would they allocate the bonus in a way so that the total compensation would equal, or would they allocate in a way so that the salary component would equal, or would they aim to equally split the bonus without changing any of the previous inequality in total compensation. Moreover, I would like to know whether their behavior is impacted by whether the allocated component (salary or benefit) is transparent. I am also interested to know whether the allocator's gender impacts their decisions.
Intervention
The main intervention treatments is about the transparency of the earnings that the allocators are making decisions on. The salary category is transparent, it suggests that the two workers can view each other's salary amount both before and after the bonus earnings allocations. Benefit category is non-transparent, it suggests that the two workers can not view each others' benefits earnings at any time of the project.
The allocator, who allocate the bonus earnings between the two workers, would allocate either through the transparent salary category, or through the non-transparent benefits category. I investigate how allocator's decisions are impacted by the two different categories.
If I observe asymmetric allocation behavior between salary and benefit. More robust treatments will be added.
Experimental design
First, two workers are randomly endowed with some amount of salary and benefit. Yet, one worker's total compensation is lower than the other.
Then, the allocators can allocate some bonus earnings between the two workers. They will allocate these bonus earnings either through the transparent salary category, or through the non-transparent benefit category. The allocators will face several possible scenarios where the two workers are endowed.
In particular, the have several allocation options. The option could allow them to equalize the total compensation between the two workers. The option could also allow the allocator to realize equalization in the allocated category. These above goals sometimes can be realized together through the same option. We could also view the options as whether it keeps the current inequality, remove the inequality, or enlarge the inequality.
That is, I would like to study whether allocators decisions are influenced by transparency.
Design details
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