Advice and behavior in a dictator game: An experimental study
How to cite
Pan, Xintong; He, Simin. 2023. "Advice and behavior in a dictator game: An experimental study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012344. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12344-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We experimentally study the effects of advice on decision-making in a dictator game. In the experiment, participants receive no advice, selfish advice, or fair advice before making decisions. Advisors do not benefit from the actions of the decision-makers. We hypothesize that participants who receive fair (selfish) advice are more likely to choose the fair (selfish) option, compared to those who receive no advice. However, the impact of selfish advice is stronger than that of fair advice. The experimental design enables us to investigate the impact of both fair and selfish advice in moral dilemmas.
Intervention
In a between-subjects design, participants are randomly assigned to one of the three treatments: baseline, fair advice, and selfish advice treatments. Participants are randomly and independently assigned into pairs and play a one-shot binary dictator game in each treatment. In the baseline, dictators directly choose between the fair and the selfish options that determine the earnings of dictators and their corresponding receivers. In the fair (selfish) advice treatment, dictators receive fair (selfish) advice before making their choices.
Experimental design
The main experiment comprises two distinct parts. The game in each part is played only once. In Part 1, participants are required to complete a social value orientation test that assesses their preferences regarding the monetary payoffs of both themselves and others. In Part 2, participants participate a binary dictator game, where the advice given to the dictators varies across treatments. The game offers two options: the selfish option yields 50 points for the decision-maker (dictator) and zero points for the other player (receiver), and the fair option yields 40 points for both players. In the baseline, dictators directly choose between the fair and the selfish options that determine the earnings of dictators and their corresponding receivers. In the fair (selfish) advice treatment, dictators receive fair (selfish) advice before making their choices.
To obtain advice from advisors for use in the main experimental treatments, we first conduct an independent advice-eliciting experiment. During this experiment, participants are recruited as advisors, and are asked to provide advice to the dictators in a similar dictator game which fair option is default.
Design details
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