Advice and behavior in a dictator game: An experimental study

How to cite

Pan, Xintong; He, Simin. 2023. "Advice and behavior in a dictator game: An experimental study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012344. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12344-1.0

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Xintong Pan* , Simin He

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012344
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12344-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2023-05-31 – 2023-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C91, D63, D83
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12344

Abstract

We experimentally study the effects of advice on decision-making in a dictator game. In the experiment, participants receive no advice, selfish advice, or fair advice before making decisions. Advisors do not benefit from the actions of the decision-makers. We hypothesize that participants who receive fair (selfish) advice are more likely to choose the fair (selfish) option, compared to those who receive no advice. However, the impact of selfish advice is stronger than that of fair advice. The experimental design enables us to investigate the impact of both fair and selfish advice in moral dilemmas.

Intervention

In a between-subjects design, participants are randomly assigned to one of the three treatments: baseline, fair advice, and selfish advice treatments. Participants are randomly and independently assigned into pairs and play a one-shot binary dictator game in each treatment. In the baseline, dictators directly choose between the fair and the selfish options that determine the earnings of dictators and their corresponding receivers. In the fair (selfish) advice treatment, dictators receive fair (selfish) advice before making their choices.

Experimental design

The main experiment comprises two distinct parts. The game in each part is played only once. In Part 1, participants are required to complete a social value orientation test that assesses their preferences regarding the monetary payoffs of both themselves and others. In Part 2, participants participate a binary dictator game, where the advice given to the dictators varies across treatments. The game offers two options: the selfish option yields 50 points for the decision-maker (dictator) and zero points for the other player (receiver), and the fair option yields 40 points for both players. In the baseline, dictators directly choose between the fair and the selfish options that determine the earnings of dictators and their corresponding receivers. In the fair (selfish) advice treatment, dictators receive fair (selfish) advice before making their choices.

To obtain advice from advisors for use in the main experimental treatments, we first conduct an independent advice-eliciting experiment. During this experiment, participants are recruited as advisors, and are asked to provide advice to the dictators in a similar dictator game which fair option is default.

Design details

Randomization method
Within each experiment session, multiple treatments are implemented by randomization; the randomization is pre-determined. Subjects who sign up for the experiment receive a seat number randomly before entering the laboratory; the seat number determines the treatment subjects will experience.
Randomization unit
Individual-level randomization
Clusters
We aim to collect about 160-200 subjects for baseline treatment,160-200 subjects for the fair advice treatment, and 70-90 subjects for the selfish advice treatment. We hypothesize that the difference between the fair treatment and the baseline is smaller compared to that between the selfish treatment and the baseline. Therefore, we plan to include roughly twice as many subjects in baseline and fair treatment in comparison to the selfish treatment to detect this difference.
Observations
About 390-490 individuals, recruited via the subject pool of the Economic Lab of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.
Arms
160-200 subjects in baseline and fair advice treatment, 70-90 in selfish advice treatment.
Primary outcomes
Dictators’ choices between the selfish and fair options.
Secondary outcomes
Participants’ social value orientation test.

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Keywords