Citizen Demand for Corruption: Evidence from Tolls in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
How to cite
Reid, Otis; Weigel, Jonathan. 2016. "Citizen Demand for Corruption: Evidence from Tolls in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001231. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1231-3.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
This proposed study examines the determinants of petty corruption in the DRC, a substantial source of lost revenue for the government. In pilot data, 42% of motorcycle taxi drivers reported paying less than the official rate at tolls. To explain this high rate of non-compliance, we randomly offer motorcycle taxi drivers one of three incentives to obtain an official receipt at the toll, or a control condition. The incentives are: a payment to the driver or one of two donation-based incentives designed to shift the perceived value of tax compliance. We cross randomize these treatments with three other treatments: two different norms treatments and incentives for toll officer to issue more receipts.
Intervention
We are providing various incentives to motorcycle taxi drivers to induce them to comply with toll payments, rather than paying bribes to toll officers. The tolls studied are located on the outskirts of the city of Kananga in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These incentives will take the form of cash rebates and promised donations to charitable causes if the driver shows a valid receipt issued at a toll. There is also a set of treatments aimed at altering social norms. At the same time (cross-randomized), we plan to offer a set of financial incentives to toll officers to issue more receipts (proof of tax compliance) on certain days.
Experimental design
We plan to have drivers visit our office up to 4 times: for an initial baseline survey and for 3 follow-up surveys. Drivers will be exposed to different interventions after each visit, except the final visit. Independently, toll officers will be incentivized to issue receipts on certain randomly selected days.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.