Citizen Demand for Corruption: Evidence from Tolls in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

How to cite

Reid, Otis; Weigel, Jonathan. 2016. "Citizen Demand for Corruption: Evidence from Tolls in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001231. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1231-3.0

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Otis Reid* , Jonathan Weigel

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001231
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1231-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2016-05-30 – 2017-10-25
Countries
Private
JEL codes
H26, P48, K42
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1231

Abstract

This proposed study examines the determinants of petty corruption in the DRC, a substantial source of lost revenue for the government. In pilot data, 42% of motorcycle taxi drivers reported paying less than the official rate at tolls. To explain this high rate of non-compliance, we randomly offer motorcycle taxi drivers one of three incentives to obtain an official receipt at the toll, or a control condition. The incentives are: a payment to the driver or one of two donation-based incentives designed to shift the perceived value of tax compliance. We cross randomize these treatments with three other treatments: two different norms treatments and incentives for toll officer to issue more receipts.

Intervention

We are providing various incentives to motorcycle taxi drivers to induce them to comply with toll payments, rather than paying bribes to toll officers. The tolls studied are located on the outskirts of the city of Kananga in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These incentives will take the form of cash rebates and promised donations to charitable causes if the driver shows a valid receipt issued at a toll. There is also a set of treatments aimed at altering social norms. At the same time (cross-randomized), we plan to offer a set of financial incentives to toll officers to issue more receipts (proof of tax compliance) on certain days.

Experimental design

We plan to have drivers visit our office up to 4 times: for an initial baseline survey and for 3 follow-up surveys. Drivers will be exposed to different interventions after each visit, except the final visit. Independently, toll officers will be incentivized to issue receipts on certain randomly selected days.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization will done by a mixture of built-in randomization software in the SurveyODK survey program and randomization done in office using Stata with a specified seed.
Randomization unit
The randomization unit will be the individual-by-session. Individuals will be re-randomized each visit. The norms treatment will be randomized at the individual level. We will cluster at the level of the individual to account for any common shock by individual. For the toll officer treatment, the unit of randomization is the toll-day.
Clusters
We will have approximately 1000 drivers and we will cluster at the level of the driver. For analyses using toll officer treatments, we will do a second clustering by toll-day.
Observations
Our total number of observations will be 4000 driver-visits, of which 3000 will involve randomized treatments. The initial baseline will give us 1000 data points, but will not involve a randomized treatment.
Arms
Of the 3000 visits, we plan to assign: 1000 visits to control 1000 visits to cash rebates (500 to 1000FC, 500 to 2000FC) 500 visits to pure charity donation 500 visits to donation via government 1000 visits to social norms “wall of pride” treatment (overlapping assignment with the final two visits by drivers to the office) 500 drivers to receive information about tax payment behavior of drivers in pilot 15% of toll-days are assigned to cash incentives for toll officers.
Primary outcomes
Our key outcomes of interest are: - Whether or not driver has a receipt (both conditional on reporting a trip and not) - Amount paid by driver at the toll (both conditional on not receiving a receipt and not), according to multiple measurements - Number of trips taken - Views of government corruption

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Keywords