The role of emotions and norms in team incentives: Theory and Evidence
How to cite
Agarwal, Aayush; Dhami, Prof. Sanjit; Wei, Dr. Mengxing; Mamidi, Dr. Pavan. 2023. "The role of emotions and norms in team incentives: Theory and Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012231. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12231-4.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We explore the role of emotions such as guilt-aversion and shame-aversion, and of social/workplace norms in the determining effort choices of team members. We build a rigorous beliefs-based model to derive predictions in four different treatments that isolate the effects of various emotions and social norms. Participants will be asked to choose the amount of effort they wish to exert in a team project, while being aware of either their team partner’s effort expectations (private signals), their social group’s effort expectations (social signals with and without sanctions), or a combination of both expectations.
Experimental design
There are 6 treatment arms.
T0: Control group with no expectations conveyed to the subject, a straightforward elicitation of effort choice in a team project
T1: Private signals (team partner’s effort expectations) conveyed to the subject, the strategy method is used to elicit effort choices by varying partner expectations
T2: Social signals (social group’s effort expectations) conveyed to the subjects, the strategy method is used to elicit effort choices by varying social group’s expectations
T3: Mixed signals (combination of partner’s and social group’s effort expectations) conveyed to subjects, strategy method used to elicit effort choices by varying both types of expectations
T4: Mixed signals with sanctions (combination of partner’s and social group’s effort expectations) conveyed to subjects, strategy method used to elicit effort choices by varying both types of expectations
T5: Social signals with no sanctions and no empirical expectation signals conveyed to the subjects, the strategy method is used to elicit effort choices by varying the social group’s normative expectation signals.
Design details
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