The Inference Cost of Interventions
How to cite
Arrieta, Gonzalo; Bakhtin, Maxim. 2023. "The Inference Cost of Interventions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012230. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12230-1.1
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
The choice of whether to screen is important and prevalent in many situations, such as hiring workers or purchasing insurance. It is also implicit in many policy choices. If a policy encourages uniform behavior, different types of people behave similarly, making it impossible to infer the person's type from their behavior. Choosing whether to screen can be difficult because it requires trading off immediate costs with delayed benefits. We propose that individuals may screen too little because they fail to consider the effects of inference. To test this hypothesis, we conduct an online experiment that simulates a hiring scenario with an initial trial task. Participants make two decisions: selecting a trial task and then choosing which candidate to hire. We hypothesize that the majority of participants will opt for the suboptimal task that does not reveal the candidates' quality. This will lead to suboptimal hires and lower payoffs because these participants will not know which candidate is better. We further hypothesize that this mistake is driven largely by the failure to anticipate inference and test this using a treatment that provides inference automatically. Lastly, we test whether planning ahead reduces the mistake and whether participants value it enough. This result would show that planning is a useful intervention, but people may not take it up themselves.
Experimental design
In our experiment, there are two computers and two tasks. One computer is Good, the other is Bad, but the participants do not know which computer is Good. One task is Separating; the other is Pooling. Both computers perform equally well on the Pooling task. On the Separating task, the Good computer performs better than the Bad computer, which allows inferring the computers' quality from their output.
Participants face 10 rounds. Each round consists of two parts. Part 1 is a choice between the Pooling and Separating tasks. The participant's bonus from this part is the amount the two computers produce on the chosen task. Part 2 is a choice between hiring one of the computers to work on a Separating task or getting an outside option based on the amount the computers produce in part 1. In rounds 1 and 10, the parameters of the problem are such that it is optimal to choose the Separating task in part 1. In rounds 2-9, it is optimal to choose the Separating task in half of the rounds and the Pooling task in the other half of the rounds, in randomized order.
There are four treatments. In Baseline treatment, participants make the part 1 choice first. Then, they observe the output of both computers and make the part 2 choice. In the Automatic Inference treatment, participants face the interface except we them which computer is Good and which is Bad if they choose the Separating task and do not tell them if they choose the Pooling task. We add this information to the part 1 question. In the Strategy Method treatment, participants first answer part 2 questions conditional on possible task choices, with inference done for them in the case of Separating tasks. Then, they make their part 1 choice, where they see their possible payoffs from parts 1 and 2 for the two task choices, given their part 2 strategy. In the Planning treatment, participants make part 1 and part 2 choices on the same screen in reverse order: they first see the part 2 question and then the part 1 question.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.