Attacking Tax Evasion in Production Networks: Theory and Evidence from Paraguay

How to cite

Best, Michael; Pierri, Gaston; Sadler, Evan. 2023. "Attacking Tax Evasion in Production Networks: Theory and Evidence from Paraguay." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012208. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12208-1.0

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Michael Best* , Gaston Pierri , Evan Sadler

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012208
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12208-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2021-01-01 – 2024-06-30
Countries
Paraguay ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12208

Abstract

The creation of a tax system that raises substantial revenues efficiently and equitably is one
of the central challenges in economic development. In large part, this relies on the creation of
the capacity to enforce taxes effectively—to reduce tax evasion. Doing this requires a detailed
understanding of the drivers of tax evasion and the optimal allocation of extremely scarce tax
enforcement resources. Our project combines new theory and a Randomized Controlled Trial
(RCT) in Paraguay to provide new insights into tax evasion by firms, the strength of enforcement
spillovers through production networks, and how to optimally target enforcement activities.

Intervention

The intervention in the first experiment consists of sending notices to taxpayers suspected of underreporting
their taxable sales, based on the work of Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal (2017). For
each taxpayer-month we calculated the sum of sales made by that taxpayer as reported by their clients in third-party information reports (“libros de compras”) annexed to the clients’ VAT returns. If this amount was larger than the total sales reported by the taxpayer by at least
10,000,000 Guaranies (around USD 7,000), that taxpayer-month was eligible to receive a notice.

Experimental design

We randomly assign taxpayers to receive notices. The randomization method is optimized to allow for the detection of spillovers.

Design details

Randomization method
computer
Randomization unit
taxpayer
Clusters
5500 taxpayers
Observations
5,500 treated taxpayers, circa 100,000 untreated taxpayers. All observed in the administrative data from January 2021-present.
Arms
5,500 treated, remaining 29,000 eligible firms as controls
Primary outcomes
Do firms that receive the intervention declare more sales? Less inputs? Pay more taxes? Is the discrepancy between the seller's VAT reports and the sum of the buyers' purchases report reduced by the intervention? Is the discrepancy between the seller's bilateral sales reports and the buyer's bilateral purchases report reduced by the intervention? Do the clients of firms that received the intervention change their behaviour? Do the suppliers of firms that received the intervention change their behaviour?
Secondary outcomes
Do firms update their tax declaration? When do they make these amendments? Do firms pay more taxes on the declarations for which there were discrepancies?
Sponsors
Name: National Science Foundation Location: USA Url: https://www.nsf.gov/
Partners
Name: Subsecretaría de Estado de Tributación (SET) Partner_type: government Url: https://www.set.gov.py/web/portal-institucional/

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Keywords