Attacking Tax Evasion in Production Networks: Theory and Evidence from Paraguay
How to cite
Best, Michael; Pierri, Gaston; Sadler, Evan. 2023. "Attacking Tax Evasion in Production Networks: Theory and Evidence from Paraguay." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012208. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12208-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The creation of a tax system that raises substantial revenues efficiently and equitably is one
of the central challenges in economic development. In large part, this relies on the creation of
the capacity to enforce taxes effectively—to reduce tax evasion. Doing this requires a detailed
understanding of the drivers of tax evasion and the optimal allocation of extremely scarce tax
enforcement resources. Our project combines new theory and a Randomized Controlled Trial
(RCT) in Paraguay to provide new insights into tax evasion by firms, the strength of enforcement
spillovers through production networks, and how to optimally target enforcement activities.
Intervention
The intervention in the first experiment consists of sending notices to taxpayers suspected of underreporting
their taxable sales, based on the work of Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal (2017). For
each taxpayer-month we calculated the sum of sales made by that taxpayer as reported by their clients in third-party information reports (“libros de compras”) annexed to the clients’ VAT returns. If this amount was larger than the total sales reported by the taxpayer by at least
10,000,000 Guaranies (around USD 7,000), that taxpayer-month was eligible to receive a notice.
Experimental design
We randomly assign taxpayers to receive notices. The randomization method is optimized to allow for the detection of spillovers.
Design details
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