Tax system, Opt-in and Image concern in Philanthropic Behavior
How to cite
KIM, YOUNGROK; Kato, Hiroki. 2023. "Tax system, Opt-in and Image concern in Philanthropic Behavior." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012183. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12183-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
Tax incentives can encourage charitable giving, potentially benefiting both society and taxpayers. Some research has shown that image concerns affect donation decisions, so this paper introduces an experimental approach to directly test whether donation behavior can be influenced by image concern.
Specifically, we will test two hypotheses: 1) How the donation behavior changes when image concern is involved in an environment where the income and benefits of donating are unequal. 2) the interrelationship between unequal social position, image concern, and the impact of reporting costs on the use of rebates. To achieve this goal, we devised a total of 2x2 treatment groups based on whether image concern was considered and whether opt-in was introduced. We will be testing this in a laboratory setting at Kansai University in Japan with approximately 200 to 300 university students. In this experiment, we will examine how subjects respond to different refund rates for donations with different image concerns and opt-in.
Intervention
There are a total of four treatment groups in our experiment. Each treatment group is divided by whether or not they opted-in and whether or not they disclosed information about the amount of their donation. Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of each treatment group. The first treatment group is blind to the amount of their contributions, i.e., their decision-making behavior is private. If a donation is made, the refund amount is automatically calculated and paid to the subject according to each pattern.
In the second treatment group, if they are selected as an actor, the other party will know about their donation amount. They also know that the other party will know the outcome of their donation behavior. If a player is selected as an observer, they know the amount of their opponent's contribution. In the case of a refund, the refund amount is automatically calculated and paid to the subject.
For treatment groups 3 and 4, the opt-in is set so that the refund amount is no longer automatically paid. If they want to receive the refund, they must enter it on the screen at the end of all rounds using the receipt number issued at the time of the donation.
Experimental design
At the beginning, before the round starts, participants will be given an exercise. The quiz repeats until all the answers are correct. If a subject gives an incorrect answer to an exercise, an on-screen explanation of the incorrect answer is provided. Next, they play a one-shot game repeatedly (11 rounds). After each round, we randomly reassemble the groups and fixed the roles. Finally, at the end of the experiment, a short survey related to the experiment is presented.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.