The Role of Financial Incentives in Screening and Inducing Effort: Evidence from a Manufacturing Firm in China
How to cite
Wang, Shing-Yi; Cai, Jing; Luo, Sai. 2023. "The Role of Financial Incentives in Screening and Inducing Effort: Evidence from a Manufacturing Firm in China." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012140. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12140-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Economic theory suggests the potential role that wage setting can play in reducing turnover and increasing productivity. In this project, we explore two ways in which higher wages can affect productivity and turnover, through the selection of better job applicants (i.e. hidden characteristics) and by inducing worker effort (i.e. hidden action). First, to study selection, we will randomize workers into two groups at the recruitment stage, by varying the compensation (i.e. bonus) that they are offered prior to the job applicants accepting the job. Second, to test for moral hazard, within the first control group that does not receive the additional bonus at the first stage, we will have a surprise treatment where some workers will be surprised with a higher compensation bonus after they have already started at the firm. Finally, to test the trade-off between efficiency wages and increased monitoring, we will randomize the amount of monitoring done on the workers in our sample.
Intervention
We will randomize financial incentives for new hires at two points in time.
We will also randomize the subsequent monitoring of workers.
Experimental design
We will randomize financial incentives for new hires at two points in time.
We will also randomize the subsequent monitoring of workers.
Design details
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