The Role of Financial Incentives in Screening and Inducing Effort: Evidence from a Manufacturing Firm in China

How to cite

Wang, Shing-Yi; Cai, Jing; Luo, Sai. 2023. "The Role of Financial Incentives in Screening and Inducing Effort: Evidence from a Manufacturing Firm in China." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012140. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12140-1.0

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Shing-Yi Wang* , Jing Cai , Sai Luo

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012140
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12140-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2023-09-15 – 2023-12-31
Countries
China ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12140

Abstract

Economic theory suggests the potential role that wage setting can play in reducing turnover and increasing productivity. In this project, we explore two ways in which higher wages can affect productivity and turnover, through the selection of better job applicants (i.e. hidden characteristics) and by inducing worker effort (i.e. hidden action). First, to study selection, we will randomize workers into two groups at the recruitment stage, by varying the compensation (i.e. bonus) that they are offered prior to the job applicants accepting the job. Second, to test for moral hazard, within the first control group that does not receive the additional bonus at the first stage, we will have a surprise treatment where some workers will be surprised with a higher compensation bonus after they have already started at the firm. Finally, to test the trade-off between efficiency wages and increased monitoring, we will randomize the amount of monitoring done on the workers in our sample.

Intervention

We will randomize financial incentives for new hires at two points in time.

We will also randomize the subsequent monitoring of workers.

Experimental design

We will randomize financial incentives for new hires at two points in time.

We will also randomize the subsequent monitoring of workers.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
For the first randomization on incentives, we will randomize at the individual level but in batches as workers are hired over this period. For the monitoring randomization, we will randomization at the station level.
Clusters
For the monitoring experiment, the number of stations depends on the distribution of our workers across stations. We estimate 90-140 stations.
Observations
250-450 people, depending on the amount of hiring the firm does in this period
Arms
For the first experiment on incentives, we will treat one-third of the sample. For the second experiment on incentives, we will treat one-half of the relevant sample (control group on first experiment). For the monitoring experiment, half of the stations will be chosen for treatment.
Primary outcomes
Characteristics of new hires (education, age, experience, hometown, gender) Retention/Turnover Characteristics of those who stay versus leave (individual productivity and characteristics such as education, age, experience, hometown, gender) Productivity outcomes from firm administrative data Survey outcomes on work satisfaction, well-being, attitudes towards the firm and managers
Secondary outcomes
Survey will also collect social network data to examine spillovers

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Keywords