Matching with non-induced preferences

How to cite

Kühn, Sarah; Streck, Thomas; Duman, Papatya; Stroh-Maraun, Nadja; Hoyer, Britta. 2023. "Matching with non-induced preferences." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012118. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12118-1.0

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Sarah Kühn* , Thomas Streck , Papatya Duman , Nadja Stroh-Maraun , Britta Hoyer

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012118
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12118-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-10-23 – 2023-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C78
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12118

Abstract

As a matching takes the preference lists of the agents as input, the preferences have a leading role in matching experiments. However, the experimenters rely on induced preferences to simulate real-world applications. We investigate participants’ behavior in matching experiments given induced and non-induced preferences. Building on the experiment by Chen and Sönmez (2006), we investigate the most frequently used school choice mechanisms (Boston school choice mechanism, Deferred Acceptance mechanism and Top Trading Cycles mechanism). In our experiment, the monetary incentives are supplemented by incentivizing participants via own preferences. As a main contribution our paper demonstrates how induced and non-induced preferences change the participants behavior (e.g. truth-telling and understanding) given different mechanisms.

Experimental design

We implement three matching mechanism each as a one-shot game with incomplete information. Each mechanism is tested by a control group with induced and a treatment group with non-induced preferences. We hereby create a 3 x 2 design.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done by a computer
Randomization unit
randomized assignment to group, randomization within group
Clusters
6 (Treatment and control groups each with 3 mechanisms)
Observations
252
Arms
42 Deferred Acceptance Mechanism Treatment 42 Boston School Choice Mechanism Treatment 42 Top Trading Cycles Mechanism Treatment 42 Deferred Acceptance Mechanism Control 42 Boston School Choice Mechanism Control 42 Top Trading Cycles Mechanism Control
Primary outcomes
Truth-telling rates and Efficiency

Cited by

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Keywords