Matching with non-induced preferences
How to cite
Kühn, Sarah; Streck, Thomas; Duman, Papatya; Stroh-Maraun, Nadja; Hoyer, Britta. 2023. "Matching with non-induced preferences." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012118. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12118-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
As a matching takes the preference lists of the agents as input, the preferences have a leading role in matching experiments. However, the experimenters rely on induced preferences to simulate real-world applications. We investigate participants’ behavior in matching experiments given induced and non-induced preferences. Building on the experiment by Chen and Sönmez (2006), we investigate the most frequently used school choice mechanisms (Boston school choice mechanism, Deferred Acceptance mechanism and Top Trading Cycles mechanism). In our experiment, the monetary incentives are supplemented by incentivizing participants via own preferences. As a main contribution our paper demonstrates how induced and non-induced preferences change the participants behavior (e.g. truth-telling and understanding) given different mechanisms.
Experimental design
We implement three matching mechanism each as a one-shot game with incomplete information. Each mechanism is tested by a control group with induced and a treatment group with non-induced preferences. We hereby create a 3 x 2 design.
Design details
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